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DOES AIRCRAFT FUEL HEDGING MAKE ECONOMIC SENSE? 
EVIDENCE FROM THE U.S. MAJOR PASSENGER AIRLINES 
SUMMARY 
We investigated the aircraft fuel hedging behavior of the U.S. major passenger 
airlines during the periods of 2002-2011, 2006-2011, 2007-2011 and 2008-2011. One 
of the goals of this study is to analyze whether airlines’ aircraft fuel hedging 
strategies affect firms’ values for such time horizons. Besides, we evaluated the 
relation between firms’ values and the percentage of next year’s fuel requirements 
hedged. 
Firms’ values were measured by the simple approximation of Tobin’s Q, developed 
by Chung and Pruitt (1993). The natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q was used as an 
explained variable. We also used different measures of aircraft fuel hedging 
activities, including the percentage of next year’s fuel requirements hedged and the 
hedging dummy variable that received a value of 1 if the airline hedges its aircraft 
fuel exposure and 0 if it does not. Along with, we added various other control 
variables in our analysis, firm size, measured by the natural logarithm of total assets, 
a dividend dummy, the ratio of long term debt to total assets, the ratio of net income 
to total assets, and the ratio of capital expenditures to sales.  
We used audited annual reports that taken from the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) 10-K filings in order to obtain both financial and operating data 
as of 31 December for the period 2002 to 2011. We searched manually over 130 
annual reports and their amendments for the period 2002 to 2011 to obtain airlines’ 
financial and operating data and hedging information that compiled from the 
footnotes. Moreover, the market value of common stock figures were taken from the 
Bloomberg database. 
Then, we tested the fixed effect model versus the pooled OLS and the random effects 
models. The fixed effect model versus the pooled OLS is tested via an F-test. To 
decide between the fixed or random effects we run a Hausmant test for each model. 
According to the Hausman test, all models should be estimated by using the fixed 
effects methodology out of the second model. Its Hausman test statistic χ2 was 
negative. Schreiber (2008) showed that the Hausman chi-square test statistic may be 
negative not only in small samples but even asymtotically as well. On the other hand, 
the fixed effect model was preferred to the pooled OLS with respect to the F-tests for 
all models. The fixed effects model is a suitable specification if we are concentrate a 
specific set of N firms and our inference limited to the behavior of these set of firm 
(Baltagi, 2001). In line with Baltagi (2001), the second model was also estimated by 
using the fixed effect methodology. In addition that we perfomed the time effect tests 
for each time horizon to determine whether we include year dummy in our models or 
not to control for the posibility of systematic time effects on airline’s firm value.That 
is to say, we determined whether the one-way error component regression model is 
valid by testing time effect. After identifying the probable models, we also tested the 
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groupwise heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and cross-sectional dependence. In 
accordance with these tests’ results, all models were estimated with fixed effect 
methodology with Driscoll-Kraay standart errors by using STATA 11.  
We found weak and statistically insignificant relation between hedging dummy and 
firm value for all periods except the period of 2007-2011. Consistent with Jin and 
Jorion (2006), hedging has no perceptible effect on firm value for the U.S. major 
passenger airlines. However, hedging with aircraft fuel exposure with derivatives 
shows negative and statistically significant at the 10% level during the period of 
2007-2011. Airlines that prefer to use aircraft fuel hedging with derivatives have on 
average a 11.28% lower value premium than airlines that do not prefer to use them 
for this time period.  
The estimated coefficients for the percentage of next year’s fuel requirements hedged 
are positive and statistically significant at the 5% level for the periods of 2002-2011 
and 2006-2011. However, the coefficients are at least positive but statistically 
insignificant for the periods of 2007-2011 and 2008-20011. In the case of Model 1, 
the coefficent of 0.2598 can be explained by declaring that an airline that hedges 
100% of its aircraft fuel requirements would be anticipated to have value premium of 
virtually 26% over an airline hedges non of its aircraft fuel requirements. The 
average percentage of next year’s aircraft fuel requirements hedged was 34.78% 
during the period 2002-2011. Hence, for those airlines in our sample, on average 
hedging airline displays a value premium of nearly 9%. The value premium is 
7.34%, 3.99% and 4% for periods of 2006-2011, 2007-2011 and 2008-2011, 
respectively. 
Although the hedging discount was valid with hedging dummy for the period of 
2007-2011, the hedging premium results were documented with the next year’s 
aircraft fuel requirements variable for the same period. At first glance, the results of 
two different hedging variables seem to contradict. However, this is not the case. If 
they had not hedged their fuel expense, their firm value would have been decreased 
more than the actual situation. For instance, the hedging discount was approximately 
-11% for the period of 2007-2011. Had they not used any hedging instruments, this 
percentage would have been lower than -11%. 
On the other hand, the dynamic models were estimated by adding lagged dependent 
variable among the regressors in order to incorporate possible effects of the previous 
year’s firm value. All dynamic models were estimated by using the fixed effects 
methodology with Driscoll-Kraay standart errors and time effects dummy. If the time 
dummies are not jointly significant, we excluded them from the models. 
Similar to previous models, we documented negative but weak and statistically 
insignificant relation between hedging dummy and firm value over all periods out of 
the period of 2008-2011. These results resemble to the outcome of the previous 
models and are consistent with Jin and Jorion (2006). On the contrary, there is a 
positive and statistically significant relationship between hedging dummy and firm 
value at the 1% level for the period of 2008-2011 consistent with the Allayannis and 
Weston (2001) and Carter et al. (2003, 2006). According to the results, those airlines 
in our sample that prefer to use aircraft fuel hedging with derivatives have on 
average a 7% higher value premium than those that do not prefer to use them over 
the period of 2008-2011. 
The estimated coefficients for the percentage of next year’s fuel requirements hedged 
are positive and statistically significant at the 5% level for the periods of 2002-2011 
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and 2006-2011. However, the coefficients are at least positive but statistically 
insignificant for the periods of 2007-2011 and 2008-20011. In the case of Model9, 
the coefficent of 0.2676 can be interpreted by declaring that an airline that hedges 
100% of its aircraft fuel requirements would be anticipated to have value premium of 
almost 26% over an airline hedges non of its aircraft fuel requirements. The average 
percentage of next year’s fuel requirements hedged was 34.78% during the period 
2002-2011. Hence, for those airlines in our sample, on average, an airline displays a 
value premium of around 9.30% [0.2676*0.3478] by implemeting hedging strategies. 
The value premium is 6.13%, 2.94% and 6.72% for periods of 2006-2011, 2007-
2011 and 2008-2011, respectively.  
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UÇAK YAKITI RİSKİNE KARŞI KULLANILAN RİSKTEN KORUNMA 
TEDBİRLERİ  İKTİSADİ OLARAK ANLAMLI MI? AMERİKANIN BÜYÜK 
YOLCU HAVAYOLU ŞİRKETLERİ ÜZERİNE BİR ÇALIŞMA 
ÖZET 
Amerika’nın büyük yolcu hava yolu şirketlerinin maruz kaldıkları uçak yakıtı riskine 
karşı riskten korunma davranışlarını 2002-2011, 2006-2011, 2007-2011 ve 2008-
2011 dönemlerinde inceledik. Çalışmayı farklı dönemlerde yapmamızın sebebi 
örneklemimizde olan bazı firmaların değişik dönemlerde yeniden yapılanma sürecine 
girmeleridir. Firmalar söz konusu süreçte özel şartlara tabi oldukları için ilgili 
dönemlerde karşılaştırılabilir sağlıklı veriler bulunmamaktadır. Bu çalışmanın 
amaçlarından bir tanesi havayolu şirketlerinin uçak yakıtı riskine karşı uyguladıkları 
riskten korunma stratejilerinin ilgili dönemlerde firma değerlerini etkileyip 
etkilemediğidir. Ayrıca, riskten korunma yöntemleriyle gelecek yılın yakıt 
gereksiniminin yüzde kaçının korunduğu ile firma değeri arasındaki ilişkiyi 
araştırdık.  
Bağımlı değişkenimiz Chung ve Pruitt’in 1993 yılında önerdiği Tobin’in Q’sunun 
basit yaklaşık hesaplanmasıdır. Riskten korunma faaliyetlerini ölçmek için iki ölçü 
kullandık. İlki, gelecek yılın yakıt gereksiniminin yüzde kaçının riskten 
korunduğudur. Diğeri ise, riskten korunma faaliyeti ile ilgili gölge değişkendir. İlgili 
dönemde herhangi bir türev ürün kullanılarak riskten korunma stratejisi belirlenmişse 
söz konusu gölge değişken 1 değerini, belirlenmemişse 0 değerini aldı. Bunlara ek 
olarak, firma değerini etkileyebilecek bazı değişkenleri kontrol değişkeni olarak 
modelimize dahil ettik. Söz konusu kontrol değişkenleri; firma büyüklüğü, firmanın 
ilgili dönemlerde temettü dağıtıp dağıtmadığı, uzun vadeli borçların toplam 
varlıklara oranı, net gelirin toplam varlıklara oranı ve sermaye harcamalarının 
satışlara oranı şeklinde sıralanabilir. 
Çalışmada kullanılan finansal ve operasyonel verileri Menkul Kıymetler ve Borsa 
Komisyon’nundan (SEC) alınan şirketlere ait yıllık denetim raporu olan 10-K 
dosyalarından elde ettik. Yaklaşık 130 denetim raporunu ve varsa değişiklik 
raporlarını manuel olarak inceleyerek gerekli veri setini oluşturduk. Ayrıca adi hisse 
senetlerinin piyasa değerlerini Bloomberg veri tabanından çektik.  
Sabit etkiler modelini havuzlanmış en küçük kareler ve rassal etkiler modellerine 
karşı test ettik. Sabit etkiler modelini havuzlanmış en küçük kareler modeline karşı 
F-testi yaparak rassal etkiler modeline karşı ise Hausman testi yaparak inceledik. 
Hausman testi sonucuna göre ikinci model dışındaki tüm modellerin sabit etkiler 
yöntemi ile tahmin edilmesi gerektiği sonucu vardık. İkinci modelin ki-kare test 
istatistiği negatif çıktı. Schreiber 2008 yılında Hausman ki-kare test istatistiğinin 
sadece küçük örneklemlerde değil asimptotik olarak da negatif çıkabileceğini 
göstermiştir. F-testi sonucuna göre tüm modeller için sabit etkiler yöntemi 
havuzlanmış en küçük kareler yöntemine tercih edilmiştir. Buna ek olarak, 
gözlenemeyen zaman etkilerini kontrol etmek için zaman gölge değişkenin modele 
dahil edilip edilmemesi hususunda zaman etkileri testi yaptık. Muhtemel modelleri 
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tanımladıktan sonra, birimlere göre heteroskedasite, otokorelasyon ve birimler arası 
korelasyon testlerini tüm modeller üzerinde uyguladık. Bu testlerin sonuçları 
doğrultusunda, tüm modeller Driscoll-Kraay standart hataları ile sabit etkiler 
yöntemine göre STATA 11 ekonometri programında tahmin edildi. 
2007-2011 dönemi haricinde diğer tüm dönemler için riskten korunma gölge 
değişkeni ile firma değeri arasında zayıf ve istatistiksel olarak anlamsız bir ilişki 
bulduk. Jin ve Jorion’un 2006 yılındaki çalışmasıyla tutarlı olarak, söz konusu 
dönemde Amerika’nın büyük yolcu havayolu şirketleri için riskten korunma 
tedbirleri ile firma değerleri arasında elde tutulur bir ilişki bulunamamıştır. Ancak, 
2007-2011 döneminde söz konusu örneklem için incelen ilişki negatif ve 10% 
seviyesinde istatistiksel olarak anlamlıdır. İlgili dönem ve örneklemde, türev 
ürünlerini kullanarak yakıt riskinden korunmayı tercih eden havayolu firmaları tercih 
etmeyenlere nazaran ortalama olarak 11.28% daha düşük değer primine sahip 
olacaklardır.  
Diğer taraftan, gelecek yılın yakıt gereksiniminin yüzde kaçının riskten korunduğunu 
gösteren değişkenin tahmin edilen katsayısı 2002-2011 ve 2006-2011 dönemleri için 
pozitif ve istatistiksel olarak anlamlıdır. Model 1’e baktığımızda, ilgili katsayı 0.2598 
şöyle yorumlanabilir; gelecek senenin yakıt gereksiniminin tamamını türev ürünler 
ile riskten koruyan havayolu şirketleri türev ürünleri ile herhangi bir koruma 
yapmayan havayolu şirketlerine nazaran yaklaşık 26% değer primine sahip 
olacaklardır. 2002-2011 döneminde gelecek senenin yakıt gereksiniminin 34.78% lik 
bölümü türev ürünleri ile riskten korunmuştur. Böylece, söz konusu dönem ve 
örneklem için ortalama olarak 9% değer priminden bahsedebiliriz [0.2598*34.78%]. 
Değer primi 2006-2011, 2007-2011 ve 2008-2011 dönemleri için sırasıyla 7.34%, 
3.99% ve 4% dir. 
İlk bakışta, iki farklı ana değişken ile tahmin edilen farklı modellerin sonuçlarının bir 
biri ile çeliştiği şeklinde bir algı oluşabilir. Ancak, söz konusu firmaların herhangi bir 
riskten korunma aracı kullanmadıklarında durumları şimdikinden daha kötü olabilir. 
Örnek vermek gerekirse 2007-2008 dönemi için tahmin edilen modelde riskten 
korunma faaliyetlerine atfedilen değer değişmesi -11% dir. Şayet bu firmalar maruz 
kaldıkları risklere karşı herhangi bir şey yapmasalardı değer değişimi muhtemelen     
-11%’den daha düşük olacaktı. 
Diğer taraftan, geçmiş dönem firma değerinin bir sonraki dönem firma değerine 
muhtemel etkilerini modele dahil etmek için modele bağımlı değişkenin bir dönemlik 
gecikmeli değerini dahil ederek daha önceki modelleri dinamik hale getirdik. Tüm 
dinamik modelleri zaman gölge değişkenlerini de dahil ederek dengeli panel sabit 
etkiler yöntemi ile tahmin ettik. Zaman gölge değişkenleri müştereken anlamlı değil 
ise söz konusu değişkenleri modelden çıkardık. 
Daha önce tahmin ettiğimiz modellere benzer şekilde 2008-2011 dönemi haricinde 
firma değeri ve riskten korunma gölge değişkeni arasında negatif ve istatistiksel 
olarak anlamsız bir ilişkiyi bulguladık. Jin ve Jorion’un 2006 yılındaki çalışmasıyla 
tutarlı olarak, söz konusu dönemde Amerika’nın büyük yolcu havayolu şirketleri için 
riskten korunma tedbirleri ile firma değerleri arasında elde tutulur bir ilişki 
bulunamamıştır. Diğer taraftan, 2008-2011 döneminde söz konusu örneklem için 
incelen ilişki pozitif ve 1% seviyesinde istatistiksel olarak anlamlıdır. İlgili dönem ve 
örneklemde, türev ürünlerini kullanarak yakıt riskinden korunmayı tercih eden 
havayolu firmaları tercih etmeyenlere nazaran ortalama olarak 7% daha yüksek değer 
primine sahip olacaklardır. 
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Diğer taraftan, gelecek yılın yakıt gereksiniminin yüzde kaçının riskten korunduğu 
değişkeninin tahmin edilen katsayısı 2002-2011 ve 2006-2011 dönemleri için pozitif 
ve 5% seviyesinde istatistiksel olarak anlamlıdır. Model 1’e baktığımızda, ilgili 
katsayı 0.2676 şöyle yorumlanabilir; gelecek senenin yakıt gereksiniminin tamamını 
türev ürünler ile riskten koruyan havayolu şirketleri türev ürünleri ile herhangi bir 
koruma yapmayan havayolu şirketlerinden yaklaşık 26% değer primine sahip 
olacaklardır. 2002-2011 döneminde gelecek senenin yakıt gereksiniminin 34.78% lik 
bölümü türev ürünleri ile riskten korunmuştur. Böylece, söz konusu dönem ve 
örneklem için ortalama olarak 9.30% değer priminden bahsedebiliriz 
[0.2676*34.78%]. Değer primi 2006-2011, 2007-2011 ve 2008-2011 dönemleri için 
sırasıyla 6.13%, 2.94% ve 6.72% dir. 
 
 
 
 
  xxvi 
 
  1 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
According to the Oxford Economic study, Economic Benefits from Air Transport in 
the US, published by IATA in May 2012, the aviation sector provided $669.5 billion 
in gross added value which is 4.9 percent of the U.S. economy. Of this, $206.4 
billion came directly from airlines, airports and related ground services. Thus, U.S. 
airlines are considered to be indispensable facilitators of the U.S. economy.However, 
they have constantly faced sudden cost increase from rising aircraft fuel prices. 
According to the Air Transportation of America (ATA), aircraft fuel is an airline’s 
second largest cost following the labor cost. As shown in Figure 1.1, the percentage 
of fuel costs in operating expense have continuously raised until the year of 2008 for 
the U.S. major passenger airlines. Approximately 36% of operating expense came 
from aircraft fuel cost in 2008. It has increased from virtually 13% to 35%. If this 
increasing trend keeps on in future, the aircraft fuel cost will be dominant cost factor. 
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Figure 1.1 : Aggregated Average Fuel Cost % of Operating Expense for the U.S. Major 
Passenger Airlines. 
Three approaches are generally used to deal with fuel prices by airlines. These are 
increasing the fuel efficiency of their operations, passing cost increase on to their 
customers as price increases or surcharges, and hedging fuel costs using physical or 
derivatives markets. Changing fuel efficiency is closely related to alteration in 
operating procedures or tankering policies. Substituting existing aircraft with more 
fuel efficient ones may take place gradually. However, it reduces profit volatility 
from fuel price changes in the same way permanent fuel hedging policy. On the other 
hand, there are limits to how much can be achieved increasing fuel efficiency, given 
safety requirements. Airlines can pass fuel cost increases on to their customers on the 
cargo side, however, surcharges are rarer on the passenger side (Morrell, 2007).  
Airline managers usually declare that their aim is to stabilize fuel prices and hence 
overall costs, cash flows and profits by implementing hedging strategies. The 
implication is that the market will react to declined profits volatility, with a higher 
stock price. The rationale of aircraft fuel hedging is to reduce a major source of 
swings in profits against a sudden up-turn in fuel prices, and possibly increase the 
price of airline’s stock. If volatility in profits is not reduced by using hedging 
instruments, hedging may still play an accounting role in transfering profits from one 
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time period to another, insure against bankruptcy, and signal the competence of 
management to investors. Three ways can be used against aircraft fuel price risk: 
forward contracts, futures contracts, options, collars and swaps (Morrell and Swan, 
2006). 
The behavior of jet fuel and crude oil prices have been of great interest on academic 
events in the last decade. For example, SIAM Minisymposium called “New Horizons 
in Quantitative Methods for Finance and Economics” was organised by Ahmet 
Duran and Gunduz Caginalp, in July, 2006 in Boston and this topic was discussed. 
More recently, hedging in airlines industry was one of the main topics of 
International Conference on Mathematical Finance and Economics held in July, 2011 
in Istanbul and “Efficient Strategies in Energy Markets” panel was moderated by 
Stathis Tompaidis. 
Most studies have focused on determinants of a firm’s decision to hedge. Someof 
them are Smith and Stulz (1985), Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) and Nance, 
Smith and Smithson (1993). No study has addressed the question of whether there is 
a direct relation between hedging and firm value until Allayannis and Weston’s 
(2001) study. 
According to the perfect market hypothesis of Modigliani and Miller (1958), the firm 
value is independent from hedging strategy due to the fact that shareholders can 
hedge on their own by holding well-diversified portfolios and firms does not face any 
frictions, such as financial distress costs, taxes, costly external finance, asymmetric 
information and so on. However, in real financial market, there are market 
imperfections that lead to some value effect of hedging due to relaxing the 
assumptions of a perfect market and introducing frictions into the Modigliani and 
Miller model (Khediri and Folus, 2010). 
There is no consensus in the literature on this subject. Although Allayannis and 
Weston (2001), Carter et al. (2003, 2006, 2006b) documented that there is a hedging 
premium, Nyguyen and Faff (2010) and Khediri and Folus (2010) stated that a 
hedging discount is imposed on derivatives users rather than a hedging premium. On 
the other hand, Jin and Jorion (2006) demonstrated that hedging has no perceptible 
effect on firm value for oil and gas producers. Furthermore, Zou (2010) found that 
there is an inverted U-shape relation between property insurance and firm value. 
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We followed the methodology pioneered by Allayannis and Weston (2001) and after 
used by Carter et al. (2003) on entire U.S. airline industry in order to examine the 
relation between firm value and aircraft fuel hedging. Our main difference is to 
evaluate only the U.S. major passenger airlines instead of testing entire industry. This 
is the first attempt to examine the relation between aircraft fuel hedging and firm 
value for the U.S. major passenger airlines. One of the reasons why we concentrate 
only on major airlines is that major airlines hedge their jet fuel cost more commonly 
than smaller airlines. Due to the application of fresh-start reporting, we divided the 
entire period of 2002-2011 into four different periods of 2002-2011, 2006-2011, 
2007-2011 and 2008-2011.  
After identifying the probable models, we tested the groupwise heteroskedasticity, 
autocorrelation and cross-sectional dependence. In accordance with these tests’ 
results, all models were estimated with balanced panel fixed effect model with 
Driscoll-Kraay standart errors by using STATA 11. 
Our results suggest that consistent with Jin and Jorion (2006), hedging has no 
perceptible effect on firm value for the U.S. major passenger airlines. However, 
hedging with aircraft fuel exposure with derivatives shows negative and statistically 
significant at the 10% level during the period of 2007-2011. Moreover, airlines that 
prefer to use aircraft fuel hedging with derivatives have on average a 11.28% lower 
value premium than airlines that do not prefer to use them.  
On the other hand, the estimated coefficients for the percentage of next year’s fuel 
requirements hedged are positive and statistically significant at the 5% level for the 
periods of 2002-2011 and 2006-2011. However, these coefficients are at least 
positive but statistically insignificant for the periods of 2007-2011 and 2008-2011. 
For those airlines in our sample, on average, airline that hedge their fuel cost exhibits 
a value premium of around 9%, 7.34%, 3.99% and 4% for periods of 2002-2011, 
2006-2011, 2007-2011 and 2008-2011, respectively. 
Lastly, the dynamic models were estimated by adding lagged dependent variable 
among the regressors in order to incorporate possible effects of the previous year’s 
firm value. All dynamic models were estimated by using the balanced panel fixed 
effects model with Driscoll-Kraay standart errors and time effects dummy. If the 
time dummies are not jointly significant, we excluded them from the models. 
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The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. The next chapter presents broad 
literature review on this topic. In chapter 3, we give information about our sample, 
define both dependent variable and independent variables, construct our econometric 
models and finally give results of our empirical models. Lastly, final chapter sets out 
the concluding remarks. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
No study has conducted in order to examine whether hedging affects firm value until 
the last decade. Most studies have concentrated determinants of a firm’s decision to 
hedge. Therefore, there are a few researches on this topic in the literature. It is the 
first time Allayannis and Weston (2001) examined the potential impact of the use of 
foreign currency derivatives on firm value. Their seminal paper has initiated further 
empirical researches. Many researchers have benefited greatly from their model as a 
benchmark. The first study that investigates the relationship between jet fuel hedging 
and firm value was conducted by Carter, Rogers and Simkins (2003). In this section, 
we have listed studies that analyze firms’ hedging behaviour, its rationales and its 
potential impact on firm value in chronological order, and have summarised main 
results of these studies. 
Smith and Stulz (1985) develop a positive theory of the hedging by value-
maximizing corporations in which hedging is part of the overall corporate financing 
policy.By examining taxes, contracting costs and the impact of hedging policy on the 
firm’s investment decisions as explanations of the observed wide diversity of 
hedging practices among large and widely-held corporations, they show that a value-
maximizing firm can hedge for three reasons: (i) taxes (ii) cost of financial distress, 
and (iii) managerial risk aversion. 
Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) observe that when external finance is more costly 
than internally generated sources of funds, it can make sense for firms to hedge. 
They propose that hedging is beneficial if it can allow a firm to avoid unnecessary 
fluctuations in either investment spending or funds raised from outside investors. 
They state that to the what extent that hedging can decrease variability in cash flows, 
it can raise the value of the firm. In Froot et al. (1993), the underinvestment problem 
which would stem from variation in cash flows and costly access to external 
financing can be reduced by using hedging strategies. Similar to Smith and Stulz’s 
(1985) reasons for hedging, they also point out rationales behind corporate risk 
management which can be listed as (i) managerial motives, (ii) taxes, (iii) costs of 
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financial distress and debt capacity, and (iv) capital market imperfections and 
inefficient investment. 
Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993)  provide additional evidence which complements 
other examinations of corporate hedging policy. They state that firms hedge so as to 
reduce expected tax liabilities, to lower expected transactions costs, and to control 
agency problems. They conclude that the value of the firm can be increased by 
implementing off-balance-sheet hedging via reducing expected taxes, the cost 
associated with financial distress, or agency costs. They express benefits of hedging 
as (i) reduction in expected taxes, (ii) reduction in expected transactions costs of 
financial distress, and (iii) reduction in agency costs. 
Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) conducted research on Fortune 500 U.S. 
industrial firms for fiscal year 1990 in order to analyze the determinants of corporate 
use of currency derivatives from perspectives of managers, debtholders, and 
equityholders. They found that firms with greater growth opportunities and low 
accessibility to both internal and external financing which can be called tight 
financial constraints are most likely to use currency derivatives. In brief, they 
documented that firms’ use of currency derivatives is positively related to growth 
opportunities, consistent with the Froot et al. (1993) theory of hedging. Their 
findings suggest thatfirms that encounter greater variation in cash flow stemming 
from exposure to foreign exchange-rate risk have greater potential benefits of using 
hedging derivatives.According to them, this results suggest that firms might use 
derivatives to decrease variation in cash flow that might prevent firms from investing 
from valuable growth opportunities.  
No study has addressed the question of whether there is a direct relation between 
hedging and firm value until Allayannis and Weston’s (2001) study. Most studies 
have discussed what determines a firm’s decision to hedge (Allayannis and Weston, 
2001). In their seminal paper, they examined the use of foreign currency derivatives 
in a sample of 720 large U.S. nonfinancial firms between 1990 and 1995 and its 
potential impact on firm value.  
In Allayannis and Weston (2001), they found that a positive relation between firm 
value and the use of foreign currency derivatives by using Tobin’s Q as an 
approximation for firm market value. They deduced that the hedging premium is 
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statistically and economically significant for firms with exposure to exchange rates 
and is on average 4.87% of firm value in which hedging premium ranges from 3.62% 
and 5.34% of firm value. This evidence may be evaluated as firms that use currency 
derivatives have a 4.87% higher value than firms that do not use currency 
derivatives.  
Allayannis and Weston (2001) also found evidence that firms that initiate a hedging 
strategy experience a raise in value above those firms that prefer to remain unhedged 
and that firms that give up hedging face a decline in value relative to those firms that 
prefer to remain hedged. 
Adam (2002) conducted a study on the North American gold mining industry in 
order to investigate whether the use of derivatives is likely to affect derivatives users’ 
financing policies and to reduce firms’ dependence on external capital market. He 
found that a strong positive relation between the minimum revenue guaranteed by 
hedging and investment expenditures. The implication of this result is that likelihood 
that investments can be financed internally is increased by using hedging strategies. 
He also found that firms tend to finance their investment expenditures externally 
rather than internally. The median firm that hedges finance only 86% of investment 
externally.This finding suggests that when external capital is costly, firms hedge to 
increase the correlation between internal funds and their investments in order to 
reduce their dependence on external finance. According to him, firms should fully 
hedge in the absence of any costs. In the presence of costs associated with hedging, 
firms should still fully hedge as long as the marginal benefit of hedging outweighs 
the costs. 
Guay and Kothari (2003) conducted research on 234 large non-financial corporations 
using derivatives in order to examine that financial derivatives are an economically 
important component of corporate risk management and report the magnitude of their 
risk exposure hedged by financial derivatives. They found that the median firm’s 
derivatives portfolio, at most, generates $15 million in cash and $31 million in value 
by changing interest rates, currency exchange rates, and commodity prices 
simultaneously by three standard deviations.  
They criticized previous researches (e.g., Allayannis and Weston, 2001) not to have 
sufficient large sample in order to explore to what extent the sample firms’ 
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derivatives positions are beneficial. They also claimed that the substantial raises in 
firm value presented in the previous studies are either caused by other risk 
management strategies (e.g., operetional hedges) that are correlated with derivatives 
use, or that the results are spurious. 
Although previous studies examined whether the corporate use of derivatives is 
consistent with theories of hedging, none of them documented large sample evidence 
on the magnitude of a firm’s risk exposure hedged by financial derivatives. Without 
such evidence, it is difficult to evaluate the significance of corporations’ financial 
derivatives portfolio in managing risk (Guay and Kothari, 2003). 
Carter, Rogers and Simkins (2003) focused their attention on the underinvestment 
rationale for hedging documented by Froot et al. (1993) instead of the benefits of 
hedging from tax convexity, expected direct bankruptcy costs, and increase in the 
debt tax shield.  
By taking into consideration the Guay and Kothari (2003) critiques, Carter et al. 
(2003) investigated jet fuel hedging behaviour of firms in the U.S. airline industry 
during 1994-2000 to examine whether such hedging is a source of value for these 
companies. Similar to Allayannis and Weston (2001), they used Tobin’s Q as a proxy 
for firm value. In the light of the criticisms raised by Guay and Kothari (2002), they 
focused on firms using a hedgeable commodity as an input by incorporating a 
commodity risk exposure approach. 
They found that, in general, jet fuel hedging is positively related to airline firm value. 
According to them, this positive relation between hedging and value suggest that 
investors perceive such investment as positive net present value projects. They 
indicated that the average jet fuel hedging premium for airlines, which is the 
coefficient on the hedging variable, is in the range of 12-16%. Therefore, they 
deduced that the hedging premium constitutes approximately a 12-16% increase in 
firm value. They additionally found that the positive relation between hedging and 
value increases in capital investment. This finding is consistent with the Froot, 
Scharfstein and Stein (1993) framework that principal benefit of jet fuel hedging by 
airlines stem from reduction of underinvestment costs. Their results suggest that 
hedging allows airlines more ability to fund investment during periods of high jet 
fuel prices. 
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Sarmas (2004) conducted a study using financial data of S&P500 companies for the 
year 1999 and 2001 to investigate the influence of corporate hedging determinants, 
such as a firm’s tax liabilities, the financial distress costs and contracting costs on 
corporate hedging policy. His aim is to depict economic prosperity before the stock 
market bubble burst and economic slowdown after the crash by dividing sample 
periods into 1999 and 2001, respectively. He found that, in general, firms hedge to 
raise their value by reducing their expected tax liability and alleviating their financial 
distress costs, and having higher leverage increase likelihood of using hedging 
strategies. His results show that firms that prefer to hedge outperform financially 
those that prefer not to hedge during economic downturn. 
Loudon (2004) studied on three major financial risks facing airlines, which are the 
interest rate, currency and fuel price risk exposures, for Qantas and Air New 
Zealand. He found that returns for Quantas and Air New Zealand are not 
significantly exposed to interest rate or currency risk, but both are negatively 
exposed to fuel price risk in the short run.  
Cobbs and Wolf (2004) expressed an implementation dynamic hedging program that 
is actively managed by using various derivative products through the price cycle is 
the optimal strategy for airlines. They observed from SEC fillings that hedging 
increases firm value, consistent with Allayannis and Weston (2001) and Carter et al. 
(2003). 
Carter, Rogers and Simkins (2006) conducted a research to investigate jet fuel 
hedging behaivour of firms in the U.S. airline industry during 1992-2003 so as to 
analyse whether airlines’ jet fuel hedging activities influence firm value by 
estimating the empirical relationships between Tobin’s Q which is proxy for firm 
value and jet fuel hedging. They constructed their models resemble those used by 
Allayannis and Weston (2001). Consistent with their previous study (2003), they 
indicated that jet fuel hedging is positively related to airline firm value. They found 
that the hedging premium which is added firm value attributable to hedging 
constitutes approximately a 5%-10% increase in firm value. They demonstrated that 
most of the hedging premium is stemmed from the interaction of hedging with 
investment. This result is consistent with underinvestment rationale presented by 
Froot et al. (1993). They showed that the relation between the airline industry’s 
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history of investment expenditure and jet fuel cost is largely positive, and airlines 
face significant distress costs.   
Judge (2006) conducted a research to investigate the determinants of corporate 
hedging for a sample of UK non-financial firms. He found that strong evidence 
between the hedging decision and the expected cost of financial distress due to his 
definition of hedging covers all hedgers and not just derivatives users. He presented 
that larger firms, firms with more cash, firms with a greater probability of financial 
distress and with more short term debt are more likely to hedge with derivatives. His 
evidence shows that differences both in opportunities and incentives for reducing risk 
and in the types of financial price exposure perform a significant role in how firms 
hedge their risks.  
Ciner (2006) examined whether hedging or speculation is the principal rationale 
behind trading in energy future markets. His study shows that price reversals in all 
three energy futures contracts, which are the crude oil, heating oil and unleaded 
gasoline futures, are occurred after that days with high trading volume. His evidence 
suggests that hedging is relatively more important than speculation as the main 
rationale to trade energy futures markets.  
Jin and Jorion (2006) investigated whether hedging activities affect on firm value by 
using hedging performance of 119 U.S. oil and gas producers from 1998 to 2001. 
They demonstrated that hedging has no discernible effect on firm value for oil and 
gas producers, contrary to Allayannis and Weston (2001) and Carter, Rogers and 
Simkins (2003). They also verified that the firm’s stock price sensitivity to oil and 
gas prices are reduced by hedging activities.  
Carter, Rogers and Simkin's (2006b) additional research were conducted by using 28 
U.S. airlines' financial data over the period of 1992-2003 so as to investigate whether 
and how the jet fuel hedging activities of airlines affect their values. Similar to their 
previous studies and the finance literature, they used Tobin's Q ratios to measure the 
market value of firms. They found that airlines that implement hedging strategies 
have 5-10% higher Tobin's Q ratios than those that prefer not to hedge. This result 
implies that an average hedging airline exhibits a value premium of around 10%. 
They additionally illustrated that changes in jet fuel hedging are positively related to 
changes in the value of the firm. Their research documented that a change from a 
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policy of no hedging to the average level of hedging is related to an increase in value 
of approximately 5.5%.  They also found that a strong correlation between firm value 
and the interaction of hedging activity with the level of capital expenditures for 
individual airlines. They suggest that the main source of value added by hedging is 
its role in preserving the firm’s ability to take advantage of investment opportunities 
that arise when fuel prices are high and airline operating cash flows and values are 
down. Specifically, they found that the value premium associated with hedging 
increases with the level of the firm’s capital investment. 
Mackay and Moeller (2007) conducted a research to investigate how risk 
management can add value when revenues and costs are nonlinearly related to prices. 
They applied Smith and Stulz's model to the real side of the firm by using a sample 
of 34 oil refiners for the period from March 1985 to June 2004. They found that 
hedging can add value if revenues are concave in product prices or if costs are 
convex in factor prices. Their results show that risk management can add value if 
revenues and costs are nonlinearly related to risk factors such as energy prices. They 
presented that the market rewards firms that hedge when hedging creates value and 
penalizes firms that hedge when hedging destroys value. Their finding shows that 
firms that hedge financial risks create value while firms that hedge operating risks or 
both financial and operating risks destroy value. 
Hagelin et al. (2007) used a sample of Swedish firms to look at the impact on value 
of a specific incentive for bad hedging: managerial stock option plans. They provided 
evidence that when hedging is based upon incentives from managers' options, firm 
value decrease. They found statistically significant evidence that firms that hedge 
have higher valuations, which are measured by Tobin's Q, than firms that do not 
hedge. They deduced that hedging to decrease the risk exposure of managerial 
options does not necessarily benefits shareholders. Additionally, they expressed that 
managerial self interested hedging reduces firm value.  
Belghitar, Clark and Judge (2008) conducted a research by using a sample taken 
from the top 500 non-financial firms in the UK ranked by market value as of year-
end 1995 so as to investigate emprical evidence on the valuation and debt capacity 
effects of foreign currency and interest rate hedging. Their results provide evidence 
of a significant relationship between firm value, measured by Tobin’s Q, and foreign 
currency and interest rate hedging. These results are much stronger than those found 
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in previous research that have investigated US firms due to the fact that, at least in 
part, non-derivative methods for hedging are considered  in the US studies. They 
show that derivative hedging creates more value than other hedging methods. 
Sturm (2009) examined whether selective hedging strategies can realistically be 
expected to add value to carriers. His findings suggest that selectively hedging new 
highs in prices may not provide a source of value to the airline industry. However, 
selective hedging seasonal tendencies in prices may provide a source of value.   
Sebehela and Madimabe (2009) stated that the operating costs of airline can be 
minimized by using derivative hedging strategy, rather than doing nothing, especially 
in volatile economic environment; thus, derivative hedging makes better the overall 
financial position of the airline. 
Bertus, Godbey and Hilliard (2009) compared hedging performance across multiple 
hedging strategies and provided substantial evidence that the two-factor stochastic 
convenience yield model results in a more effective hedge, especially over longer 
horizons. Their findings suggest that airlines should hedge their positions in jet fuel 
by taking into consideration movements in the jet fuel, crude oil spread. 
Bartram, Brown and Fehle (2009) investigated the use of foreign exchange, interest 
rate and commodity price derivatives by 7319 firms in 50 countries that together 
constitutes approximately 80% of the global market capitalization of non-financial 
companies. They showed that derivatives use is substantially connected to other 
important financial characteristics such as leverage, debt maturity, holdings of liquid 
assets, dividend policy, and operational hedges. They provided evidence that firms 
that operate with less liquid derivatives markets, typically in middle-income 
countries, are less likely to hedge. 
Nguyen and Faff (2010) examined whether the use of specific financial derivative 
instruments is rewarded by a higher market value for a sample of Australian publicly 
listed companies over the period 1999 of 2000. Their result stated that a hedging 
discount is imposed on derivatives users rather than a hedging premium that 
documented previous studies. They found that the hedging discount related to the use 
of swaps represents a 24% reduction in firm value, while there is little evidence 
indicating that the use of options is detrimental to value. 
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Nguyen and Faff (2010b) used a sample of large Australian firms over a 2-year 
period in order to investigate the relationship between the use of financial derivatives 
and firm risk. They illustrated that this relationship is nonlinear in nature. They found 
that at the aggregate level, there is no evidence that the use of financial derivatives is 
related to a reduction in firm risk. Their findings provide evidence that in most cases, 
financial derivatives are used for hedging purposes. 
Khediri and Folus (2010) investigated the relationship between corporate hedging 
and firm value for 320 firms in France. This study is the first research that examines 
the relation between hedging and market value of French firms. They found, from the 
univariate analysis, that firms that use derivatives have lower firm value which is 
measured by Tobin’s Q than those that do not use derivatives. This empirical 
evidence of a hedging discount is consistent with the study of Nyguyen and Faff 
(2010); however, this evidence contradicts previous studies that documented a 
hedging premium, such as Allayannis and Weston (2001); Carter, Rogers and 
Simkins (2003, 2006). They attributed this discrepancy to differences in both the 
characteristics and the market valuation of French and US firms and/or the financial 
markets and investors’ behavior. On the other hand, value enhancing results that are 
documented by US sample researches have not been reported by multivariate tests. 
To sum up, they found that the use of derivatives by firms does not add value. 
Zou (2010) conducted a research in order to provide evidence about the value effect 
of alternative risk management by analyzing corporate purchase of property 
insurance that is commonly used pure hedge of asset-loss risks via data set from 
China. He found that there is an inverted U-shape relation between property 
insurance and firm value measured by different versions of Tobin’s Q. Thus, using 
property insurance, up to a certain level, has a positive effect on firm value; however, 
over insurance has a detrimental effect on firm value. Their estimation of average 
hedging premium is about 1.5% which is lower than documented figures in both 
Allayannis and Weston (2001) and Carter, Rogers and Simkins (2003, 2006).  
Parcharidis and Varsakelis (2010) examined the consequences of R&D investment 
on firm value measured by Tobin’s Q for firms publicly traded in an emerging 
financial market by using data for the manufacturing and computer firms listed in the 
Athens Stock Exchange for the period 1996-2004. They found that the decisions of a 
firm to pursue R&D activities are evaluated positively by the market, and thus the 
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R&D capital positively affects firm value. Their findings provide evidence that the 
effect of the R&D investment on the market value is higher for small firms. 
Bartram, Brown and Conrad (2011) examined the effect of derivative use on firm 
risk and value by using data set that includes 6888 non-financial firms headquartered 
in 47 different countries. They found strong evidence that both total and systematic 
risk is reduced by using financial derivatives. Their result suggest that there is a 
positive relation between derivative use and firm value, however, the effect of 
derivative use on firm value is more sensitive to endogeneity and omitted variable 
concerns. During the economic downturn in 2001-2002, using derivatives is related 
to significantly higher value, abnormal returns, and larger profits. They also 
documented that, on average, derivative user tend to be larger and older firms.  
In Gomez-Gonzales, Rincon and Rodriguez (2012), they used quarterly financial 
information of 81 large Colombian nonfinancial firms for the period March 1995-
December 2008 in order to examine the effects of risk management and hedging 
decisions on firms’ market value. They found that the growth rate of Tobin’s Q 
depends significantly on a firm’s size and hedging strategies. Their evidence 
suggests that an increase in hedging causes to a higher growth in the firms’ value.  
Allayannis, Lel and Miller (2012) investigated the effect of corporate governance on 
the value of foreign currency derivative usage using a broad sample of firms across 
39 countries with significant exchange rate exposure. They found that there is a 
positive and significant association between currency derivatives usage and firm 
value for firms with exchange rate exposure. Their evidence suggest that the 
magnitude of the hedging premium, on average, is 10.7% which means that on 
average, foreign currency derivative users are valued approximately 10.7% higher 
than nonusers. They also documented that firms that only have strong internal or 
strong external corporate governance get a significant premium for foreign currency 
derivatives, while they found no premium for firm with weak corporate governance.  
  17 
 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
In this section, we will show our sample description, define both dependent variable 
and independent variables, present their descriptive statistics and graphs, construct 
the econometric models, and finally present outcome of the empirical models, 
respectively. 
3.1 Sample Description 
According to the Air Transport Association of America (ATA), the U.S. airlines are 
classified based on the amount of their annual operating revenue. These 
classifications are major, national and regional. Major carriers are defined as an 
airline with annual operating revenue in excess of $1 billion, and national carriers are 
airlines with annual operating revenues between $100 million and $1 billion. 
Regional carriers are airlines that generate annual operating revenues less than $100 
million, and whose service is often limited to a single geographic region of the 
country. They usually transport travelers between the major cities of their region and 
smaller, surrounding communities. Further classification can be made as passenger 
and cargo (or freighter) carriers. However, we focused on only passenger airlines due 
to the fact that cargo airlines have passed fuel price increases on to their customers, 
however, on the passenger side, surcharges are rarer. 
Previous studies such as Carter et al. (2003, 2006, 2006b) used the entire U.S airline 
industry in their sample without taking into consideration the airlines’ classification. 
Aircraft fuel costs are more commonly hedged by major airlines rather than smaller 
airlines. In Carter et al. (2003), although any aircraft fuel hedging instruments had 
not ever been used by some airlines in their sample, average percentage hedged next 
year’s fuel requirements of major airlines was 23.5%. Moreover, some airlines 
operate as a charter airline that typically does not bear the risk of fluctuating fuel 
prices. That is to say, the charter’s customer refunds aircraft fuel costs.  
Including various airlines that have different characteristics into the same sample 
would lead to bias results. In order to prevent such a bias in our results, we utilized 
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only the U.S. major passenger airlines’ data in our models. This is the first attempt 
that considers only the U.S. major passenger airlines while evaluating their hedging 
performance on firm value. 
Based on the U.S. DOT Form 41 Airline Operational Cost Analysis Report which 
published by IATA in March 2011, we determined which airline is a major airline 
that constitutes our sample. In this report, American Airlines, Alaska Airlines, 
JetBlue Airways, Continental Airlines, Delta Air Lines, Airtran Airways, Hawaiian 
Airlines, Northwest Airlines, United Air Lines, US Airways, and Southwest Airlines 
are listed as a major airline among 49 US airlines. 
We calculated market share of the U.S. major passenger airlines based on available 
seat miles (ASM) in order to express to what extent our sample represents the U.S. 
airline industry. ASM represents one seat flown one mile. For instance, an airline 
with 100 passenger seats, flown distance of 100 miles, indicates 10.000 available seat 
miles. We obtained airlines’ ASM from RITA: Bureau of Transportation Statistics. 
As shown in the table 3.1, our sample represents about 85% of the U.S. domestic 
airline industry for the period of 2002-2009. There was a merger agreement between 
Delta Air Lines and Northwest Airlines in the year of 2009 that leads to ending 
Northwest Airlines’ existence as a separate entity. That’s why we excluded 
Northwest Airlines from the sample. The new sample represents 78.1% of the U.S. 
domestic airline industry for the period of 2002-2011, as shown in the table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1 : Market Share of Major Passenger Airlines based on ASM (%). 
Airlines Market Share of Major Passenger Airlines based on ASM (%) 
 
2002-09 2002-11  2002-11 2006-11 2007-11 2008-11 
American Airlines  17.4 17.1 17.1 16.3 16 15.9 
United Air Lines 14.1 13.7 
  
12.7 12.5 
Delta Air Lines 13.1 14.5 
   
16.4 
Continental Airlines 9.1 9.3 9.3 9.8 9.9 9.9 
Southwest Airlines 9 9.3 9.3 10 10.2 10.3 
Northwest Airlines 8.5 
     US Airways 6 6.3 
 
6.6 6.9 7.4 
JetBlue Airways 2.5 2.7 2.7 3.3 3.4 3.5 
Alaska Airlines 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Airtran Airways 1.7 1.9 0.9 2.3 2.4 2.4 
Hawaiian Airways 0.8 0.9 
 
1 0.9 1.1 
       Total 84.5 78.1 41.7 51.8 64.9 81.9 
Source: This table is prepared based on data that obtain Bureau of Transportation Statistics 
According to the U.S. Courts, if a business is inadequate to service its debt or pay its 
creditors, the business or its creditors can file with a federal bankruptcy court for 
protection under either Chapter 7 or Chapter 11. Among our sample, some airlines 
filed voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code 
which permits reorganization under the bankruptcy laws of the United States.  
The financial statements prior to the effective date on which the debtors emerged 
from bankruptcy are not comparable with financial statements for the periods on or 
after the effective date, nor is either period comparable to periods after the effective 
date due to the application of fresh-start reporting. That’s why, we cannot use the 
entire sample data for the period 2002 to 2011. 
Among ten U.S. major passenger airlines, four airlines which are US Airways, 
United Air Lines, Delta Air Lines and Hawaiian Airlines filed Chapter 11 filings on 
different dates. The effective dates were in September 2004, in June 2005, in 
February 2006 and in April 2007 for US Airways, Hawaiian Airlines, United Air 
Lines and Delta Air Lines, respectively. Accordingly, consolidated financial data of 
these airlines on or after the effective date are not comparable to the consolidated 
financial data prior to that date. Therefore, we formed new samples for different time 
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frame in order not to sacrifice more data from entire sample. This enables us to 
analyze the subsample periods besides the entire sample period. In this case, the 
periods of 2002-2011, 2006-2011, 2007-2011 and 2008-2011 represents 41.7%, 
51.8%, 64.9% and 81.9% of the U.S. domestic airline industry, respectively. 
We used audited annual reports that taken from the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) 10-K filings in order to obtain both financial and operating data 
as of 31 December for the period 2002 to 2011. If there was an amendment regarding 
the annual report, we took into consideration the final version of the report. We 
searched manually over 130 annual reports and their amendments for the period 2002 
to 2011 to obtain airlines’ financial and operating data and hedging information that 
compiled from the footnotes. Moreover, the market value of common stock figures 
were taken from the Bloomberg database. 
According to the International Financial Reports Standards (IFRS), firms must reveal 
whether they use derivatives and their purpose of using derivatives. In most of the 
10-K filings, item 7A called “Quantitative and Qualitative Disclosures about Market 
Risk” provides detailed information related to market risk that the airline faces and 
the derivative position for each market risk, including aircraft fuel price risk. The 
availability of clear data on hedging activity is of principal importance in any 
empirical investigation of corporate hedging. Data obtained from audited financial 
statements does not have the nonresponse bias inherent in survey designs and 
consistency of interpretation of information contained in the annual reports can be 
assumed (Judge,2006). 
On September 26, 2010, Southwest Airlines entered into a merger agreement 
providing for the company’s acquisition of Airtran Holdings, Inc.. Therefore, Airtran 
Airways no longer files reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
or provides annual reports to shareholders after 2011. Hovewer, Airtran Airways’ 
existence as a separate entity was not ended. Their availabe seat miles (ASM) data is 
available on the RITA: Bureau of Transportation Statistics. They have still provided 
services to their customers on its own behalf.  
If some observations are missing, a panel data can be described as unbalanced panel 
data. There were several missing observations in the data set. These missing 
observations were filed by using the most appropriate methods in order to implement 
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balanced panel data methodology. For instance, the method used to generate Airtran 
Airways data for the year of 2011 will be presented in the appendix I. 
In the next section, we will present the graphs of some selected variables. In order to 
represent the path of each variable for all firms with only one graph, we implemented 
the simple aggregation rule shown in the appendix J for each variable. 
As shown in table 3.2, we listed the U.S. major passenger airlines that have adequate 
and clear data for all possible time periods. We constructed econometric models for 
all these periods separately. Airlines written in red indicates the latest insertion into 
the sample except the first one that refers to exclusion. 
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Table 3.2 : Lists of U.S. Major Passenger Airlines for Different Time Periods 
Whole Sample 
ƹ  
 2002-2011
ǂ  
 2002-2011 
ξ
 2006-2011 
ϕ 
 2007-2011 
ξ
 2008-2011
Ϛ
 
(108 firm-year) (100 firm-year) (60 firm-year) (48 firm-year) (45 firm-year) (40 firm-year) 
      American Airlines American Airlines American Airlines American Airlines American Airlines American Airlines 
United Air Lines United Air Lines* 
  
United Air Lines United Air Lines 
Delta Air Lines Delta Air Lines* 
   
Delta Air Lines 
Continental Airlines Continental Airlines Continental Airlines Continental Airlines Continental Airlines 
Continental 
Airlines 
Southwest Airlines Southwest Airlines Southwest Airlines Southwest Airlines Southwest Airlines Southwest Airlines 
Northwest Airlines 
     US Airways US Airways* 
 
US Airways US Airways US Airways 
JetBlue Airways JetBlue Airways JetBlue Airways JetBlue Airways JetBlue Airways JetBlue Airways 
Alaska Airlines Alaska Airlines Alaska Airlines Alaska Airlines Alaska Airlines Alaska Airlines 
Airtran Airways** Airtran Airways Airtran Airways Airtran Airways Airtran Airways Airtran Airways 
Hawaiian Airlines Hawaiian Airlines* 
 
Hawaiian Airlines Hawaiian Airlines Hawaiian Airlines 
            
ƹ Whole sample represent about %85 of U.S. Domestic Airline Industry for the period 2002 to 2009 based on ASM.  
ǂ Excluding Northwest Airlines from  the sample due to ending its separate entity, this ratio decreases to approximately %78. 
ξBesides Northwest Airlines, United Air Lines, Delta Air Lines, US Airways, Hawaiian Airlines are excluded from the sample owing to filing a volutary petition 
for reorganization under Chapter 11 of Bankruptcy Code. Therefore, these airlines represent about %42 of the Industry for the period 2002 to 2011. 
ΦIncluding both US Airways and Hawaiian Airlines, new sample shows about %52 of the Industry for the sub-period between 2006 and 2011. 
ξWhen United Air Lines is included to the sample for the period between 2007 and 2011, approximately %65 of the Industry is represented by the new sub-sample 
ϚAll airlines except Northwest Airlines represent about %82 of the Industry for the period 2008 to 2011. 
*These airlines represent %36 of  U.S. Domestic Airline Industry for the period 2002 to 2011 based on ASM. 
**Airtran Airways no longer files reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or provides annual reports to shareholders after 2011.
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3.2 Variables 
Carter et al. (2003) followed the methodology pioneered by Allayannis and Weston 
(2001) so as to examine the relation between firm value and aircraft fuel hedging. 
However, they excluded some of controls variables that appear in Allayannis and 
Weston (2001) study such as Industrial and Geographic Diversification, Credit 
Rating. Our approach is similar to the procedure used by Carter et al. (2003) to 
investigate the same relation. Our main difference is to evaluate only the U.S. major 
passenger airlines instead of testing the entire industry. We updated the results of 
previous research of Carter et al. (2003, 2006) by both following new sampling 
method and taking different time periods which are the periods of  2002-2011, 2006-
2011, 2007-2011 and 2008-2011 due to the application of fresh-start reporting in 
contrast to the periods of 1994-2000 and 1992-2002 examined by Carter et al. (2003, 
2006), respectively. By dividing the entire sample period into the subsample periods, 
we utilized all clear available data. 
3.2.1 Dependent variable 
Our dependent variable is firm value which is measured by Tobin’s Q. This is the 
most commonly used proxy for firm value in empirical studies. As in Carter et al. 
(2003), we measured firm value using the simple approximation of Tobin’s Q, 
developed by Chung and Pruitt (1994) whose results show that at least 96.6% of the 
variability of Tobin’s Q is explained by the simple approximation of Tobin’s Q. 
Tobin’s Q which is called the market-to-book assets ratio is defined as the ratio of 
the market value of the firm to replacement cost of assets, assessed at the end of the 
fiscal year for each firm (Allayannis and Weston, 2001).  
Table 3.3 : Descriptive Statistics of Tobin's Q for Different Periods 
Period Obs Min Mean  Max 
Std. 
Dev. 
      2002 - 2011 60 0,7945 1,3921 2,4256 0,3487 
2006 - 2011 48 0,7555 1,2244 1,7791 0,2353 
2007 - 2011 45 0,7555 1,1836 1,5609 0,1964 
2008 - 2011 40 0,7894 1,1852 1,5609 0,1836 
Aggregated 10 1,0878 1,2619 1,4081 0,1335 
            
Source: This table is prepared based on our calculation of Tobin's Q 
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We presented the descriptive statistics of Tobin’s Q for different time horizons in the 
Table 3.3. As shown in the table, the average Tobin’s Q is higher than 1 for each 
time horizon. This means that, on average, the market value of the U.S. major 
airlines exceeds the replacement costs of their assets. Hovewer, there is a dramatic 
decline of the aggregated Tobin’s Q  between the year of 2006 and 2007, shown in 
Figure 3.1. The path of the aggregated Tobin’s Q can be seen in the following figure. 
 
Figure 3.1 : Aggregated Tobin's Q for U.S. Major Passenger Airlines 
By using the natural logarithm of the dependent varible (Tobin’s Q) instead of the 
absolute value of them, we can interpret positive (negative) coefficients on hedging 
dummy variables as the hedging premium (the hedging discount) consistent with 
Allayannis and Weston (2001) and Carter et al. (2003, 2006). 
As in previous studies, we can list several advantages of the simple approximation of 
Tobin’s Q: first, the computational cost is to some extent low rather than other 
complicated calculation methods. Second, the simple approximation method uses 
promptly accessible balance sheet information which can be taken from the annual 
reports to calculate Tobin’s Q. Third, as stated earlier, there is a high degree of 
relation between the simple approximation and more complex calculation of  Tobin’s 
Q. 
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According to Allayannis and Weston (2001), benefit of using Tobin’s Q is to enable 
us relatively easier comparisons across firms than comparisons based on stock 
returns or accounting measures where a risk adjustment or normalization is required. 
They also found that their findings are independent from which measure they use to 
represent firm value. 
In this study, Tobin’s Q was calculated as in the equation 3.1: 
         
                             
    
(3.1) 
Where, 
MVCS = Market Value of Common Stock (or Equity) 
LVPS = Liquidation Value of Preferred Stock 
BVLTD = Book Value of Long Term Debt 
BVCL = Book Value of Current Liabilities 
BVCA = Book Value of Current Assets 
BVI = Book Value of Inventories 
BVTA = Book Value of Total Assets 
3.2.2 Independent variables 
Our main aim is to investigate the relation between the U.S. major airlines’ firm 
value and their aircraft fuel hedging practices. To achieve this task, we need to 
describe explanatory variables that express hedging activities of these airlines. 
Hedging variables 
We used two different measures of aircraft fuel hedging activity. The first one is a 
hedging dummy, and the second one is the percentage of next year’s aircraft fuel 
requirements hedged. These variables are of central interest for the study. 
Hedging dummy (HD) 
As a proxy for aircraft fuel hedging activity, we usedthe dummy variable that is set 
to 1 for airlines that disclose any use of derivatives to hedge aircraft fuel exposure 
and otherwise 0 for nonusers. A positive (negative) value on the coefficient for this 
dummy suggests that hedging adds (reduces) value. By using the natural logarithm of 
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Tobin’s Q, a positive coefficient on hedging dummy can be interpreted as the 
hedging premium which is found in Allayannis and Weston (2001), Carter et al. 
(2003, 2006). The hedging premium can be interpreted as added firm value 
attributable to hedging activities. On the other hand, a negative coefficient may be 
interpreted as the hedging discount which is proposed in Nguyen and Faff (2010) and 
Khediri and Folus (2010). 
Percentage of next year’s fuel requirements hedged 
Airlines disclose the percentage of its coming year’s aircraft fuel requirements that 
have hedged as of the end of the fiscal year for each firm. The coefficent of this 
variable can answer the following question;if an airline hedged 100% of its aircraft 
fuel requirements, what percentage of its firm value would be expected to change 
over the airline hedged non of its aircraft fuel requirements. 
Table 3.4 : Descriptive Statistics of % of Next Year's Fuel Requirements Hedged 
Period Obs Mean Min  Max Std. Dev. 
      2002 - 2011 60 34.78 0 95 20.97 
2006 - 2011 48 29.64 0 95 18.71 
2007 - 2011 45 28.49 0 70.00 16.36 
2008 - 2011 40 29.11 0 62 16.07 
Aggregated 10 30.90 18.77 40.77 7.28 
            
Source: This table is prepared based on footnotes from the annual reports. 
Table 3.4 presents the descriptive statistics for the stated variable. Of hedging firms, 
the average percentage of next year’s aircratf fuel requirements hedged is in the 
range between 28.49% and 34.78% for the different time periods. On average, the 
U.S. major passenger airline have hedged about one-third of its next year’s fuel 
requirements. 
As shown in Figure 3.2, the aggregated percentage of next year aircraft fuel 
requirement of the U.S. major passenger airlines are followed the zigzag-shaped 
path. This aggregated variable reached the peak in the year of 2008. When compared 
the the years of 2002 and 2011, the aggregated percentage of next year aircraft fuel 
requirement decreased from nearly 40% to 18%. 
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Figure 3.2 :Aggreagted % of Next Year Fuel Hedged for U.S. Major Passenger Airlines 
Control variables 
In addition to aircraft fuel hedging, other factors that airlines have can affect their 
firm value. To show whether aircraft fuel derivative hedging increases the value of 
the U.S. major passenger airlines, we need to exclude all possible effects that comes 
from other variables. We include proxy variables in order to control these other 
effects. The control variables were structured to be consistent with those in the 
empirical analysis of both Allayannis and Weston (2001) and Carter et al. (2003, 
2006). 
Firm size 
There is ambiguous evidence whether firm size leads to higher firm value. Although 
Allayannis and Weston (2001) and Carter et al. (2003) found that a negative relation 
between firm size and firm value, Jin and Jorion (2006) and Adam (2002) 
documented that larger firms are more likely to use derivatives than smaller firms. 
However, larger firms are more probable to use hedging instruments due to the high 
start-up costs of hedging program (Allayannis and Weston, 2001). For instance, Jin 
and Jorion (2006) found that hedgers, on average, are two to three times the size of 
nonhedgers. Therefore, we need to take into consideration the possible effect of firm 
size. To do this, we included the natural logarithm of total assets in our empirical 
modelsas consistent with the previous research. Table 3.5 documents descriptive 
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statistics of the U.S. major passenger airlines’ total assets. As shown in the table, 
average amount of total assets are in the range between $9.5 billion and $14 billion. 
Table 3.5 : Descriptive Statistics for Total Assets (in thousand $) 
Period Obs Mean Min  Max Std. Dev. 
      2002 - 2011 60 10.321.919 473.450 27.650.000 8.256.511 
2006 - 2011 48 9.430.209 819.953 25.850.000 7.559.168 
2007 - 2011 45 10.742.453 823.399 25.385.000 7.859.773 
2008 - 2011 40 13.979.191 929.134 45.014.000 12.397.125 
Aggregated 10 20.207.356 15.502.137 25.135.020 3.951.939 
            
Source: This table is presented based on information from the annual reports. 
 
Dividend dummy (DD) 
Dividendshave also ambiguous impact on firm value. If hedgers face capital 
constraints, their firm value measured by Tobin’s Q may be high due to the fact that 
they are forced to invest only on the highest possible positive net present value 
projects. If a firm paid a dividend, it is less probable to be capital constrained and 
may overinvest on the negative net present value projects and may hence have a 
lower Tobin’s Q. On the other hand, dividends can be considered as a positive signal 
from management. Therefore, this leads to a higher firm value or Tobin’s Q 
(Allayannis and Weston, 2001; Carter et al. 2003; and Jin and Jorion 2006). 
Following previous studies, we used a dummy variable that equal to 1 if the firms 
paid a common dividend in the current year. Although Carter et al. (2003) found that 
the coefficients of dividend dummy are positive and significant in all models, 
Allayannis and Weston (2001) and Khediri and Folus (2010) documented that there 
is a negative relation between firm value and dividend dummy. Furthermore, as 
noted by Jin and Jorion (2006), dividend dummy has weak and inconsistent effect on 
firm value.   
Leverage  
Same as the firm’s decision to hedge, firm value may also be affected by its capital 
structure. It was argued by Carter et al. (2003) that a higher level of debt causes a 
higher probability of financial distress, and then this capital structure forces the firm 
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to hedge. In Allayannis and Weston (2001), the relation between leverage and firm 
value is ambiguous. According to Jin and Jorion (2006), coefficients of leverage 
have positive signs. On the other hand, Carter et al. (2003) and Khediri and Folus 
(2010) found that there is a negative relation between these variables, however, their 
results are all statistically insignificant. We defined leverage as the ratio of long-term 
debt to total assets as consistent with Carter et al. (2003).As shown in Table 3.6, the 
U.S. major passenger airlines have used the long-term debt in different degree to 
finance their assets (or investment). On average one third of their assets have been 
financed by the long term debt. 
Table 3.6 : Descriptive Statistics for Leverage (Long Term Debt / Total Assets) 
Period Obs Mean Min  Max Std. Dev. 
      2002 - 2011 60 0.3438 0.098 0.5422 0.117 
2006 - 2011 48 0.3402 0.1164 0.5422 0.1153 
2007 - 2011 45 0.339 0.1222 0.5398 0.1074 
2008 - 2011 40 0.3409 0.1391 0.5398 0.1033 
Aggregated 10 0.3329 0.2829 0.3687 0.0307 
            
Source: This table is prepared based on financial information from the annual reports. 
 
Figure 3.3 : Aggregated Leverage for U.S. Major Passenger Airlines 
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As shown in the Figure 3.3, the aggregated leverage of the U.S. major passenger 
airlines declined consistently  before the global financial crisis. However, this ratio 
began to raise during the years of 2007 and 2008. As shown in the following figure, 
the aggregated profitability of the U.S. major passenger airlines declined rapidly 
during the global financial crisis. How could the leverage ratio increase rapidly 
during the global financial crisis although the profitability ratio dropped below the    
-10% level? In our view, the stated path of the graph can be explained by a bailout 
process of the U.S. financial system. 
Profitability 
A profitable firm is likely rewarded more by the market. Hence, we can expect that 
when an airline hedge its aircraft fuel exposure, its Tobin’s Q will be higher. We 
used return on assets (ROA) that is the ratio of net income to total assets so as to 
incorporate possible effects of this variable into our models. Although Jin and Jorion 
(2006) showed that ROA has weak and inconsistent effects, Allayannis and Weston 
(2001), Carter et al. (2003) and Khediri and Folus (2010) found a positive relation 
between ROA and firm value. As shown in Table 3.7, average profitability of the 
U.S. major passenger airlines is fairly low for all time periods. Moreover, the net loss 
reached one third of their assets for some airlines. 
Table 3.7: Descriptive Statistics for Return on Assets (Net Income/Total Assets) 
Period Obs Mean Min  Max Std. Dev. 
      2002 - 2011 60 0,0011 -0,1327 0,1243 0,0442 
2006 - 2011 48 0,0014 -0,3063 0,1134 0,0641 
2007 - 2011 45 -0,0055 -0,3063 0,1134 0,0773 
2008 - 2011 40 -0,0166 -0,3063 0,1134 0,0856 
Aggregated  10 -0,0217 -0,1472 0,0251 0,052 
            
Source: This table is prepared based on financial information from the annual reports 
As shown in Figure 3.4, the aggregated profitability of the U.S. major passenger 
airlines declined sharply during the year of 2007. As expected, it reached the lowest 
figure in the year of 2008 due to the global financial crisis. However, it began to 
increase after the crisis.  
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Figure 3.4 : Aggregated Return on Assets (Profitability) for U.S. Major Passenger Airlines 
Investment opportunities 
An airline that has more investment opportunities is probably to be valued higher by 
the market. Khediri and Folus (2010) documented evidence that growth opportunities 
have a positive impact on firm value. Even though both Allayannis and Weston 
(2001) and Carter et al. (2003) also found a positive relation between investment 
opportunities and firm value, their results were statistical insignificant. The ratio of 
capital expenditures to sales was used as a proxy for investment opportunities as 
consistent with Carter et al. (2003). The decriptive statistics of investment 
opportunities are given in the Table3.8. 
Table 3.8 : Descriptive Statistics for Investment Opportunities (CapEx/Sales) 
Period Obs Mean Min  Max Std. Dev. 
      2002 - 2011 60 0.1205 0.0088 0.8565 0.1588 
2006 - 2011 48 0.0868 0.0088 0.4215 0.0802 
2007 - 2011 45 0.069 0.0088 0.283 0.055 
2008 - 2011 40 0.0599 0.0088 0.193 0.043 
Aggregated 10 0.0748 0.0401 0.1062 0.0236 
            
Source: This table is prepared based on financial information from the annual reports 
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The path of the aggregated investment opportunities ratio can be seen in the Figure 
3.5. As shown in the figure, this ratio have consistently decreased until the year of 
2010, and it began to increase after that year. However, the current level is far below 
the level that was in the beginning of the period. They devoted approximately 4% of 
their sales revenue to finance their capital expenditure in the year of 2011. 
 
 
Figure 3.5 : Aggregated Investment Opportunities Ratio for U.S. Major Passenger Airlines 
Time effects 
In accordance with the time effects tests, we included year dummy variables in order 
to control for the posibility of systematic time effects on airline’s firm value by 
following Allayannis and Weston (2001) and Carter et al. (2003). 
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3.3 The Models 
The sample of our investigation consists of data from the U.S. major passenger 
airlines during the periods of 2002-2011, 2006-2011, 2007-2011 and 2008-2011. To 
investigate whether the aircraft fuel hedging activities of these airlines affect their 
values, we estimated the emprical relationships between different measures of 
aircraft fuel hedging activitiesand firm values which are measured by Tobin’s Q. We 
took into consideration the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q [Ln(Tobin’s Q)] instead of 
the absolute value. We also used two different measures of aircraft fuel hedging 
activities, including the percentage of next year’s fuel requirements hedged 
[NextHedged] and the hedging dummy variable [HD] that received a value of 1 if the 
airline hedges its aircraft fuel exposure and 0 if it does not. Along with, we used 
several control variables in our analysis, firm size [Ln(TA)], measured by the natural 
logarithm of total assets, a dividend dummy [DD], the ratio of long term debt to total 
assets [Leverage], the ratio of net income to total assets [ROA], the ratio of capital 
expenditures to sales [CapExtoSales] and the time effects. 
Panel data methodology is used due to several benefits; 
1. It gives more informative data and avoids multicollinearity problems; 
moreover itprovides more efficients results. 
2. It allows testing for individual heterogeneity. 
N.B. : Ignoring parameter heterogeneity among cross-sectional and time 
series units could lead to inconsistent or meaningless estimates of interested 
parameters. 
       3. It is better able to identify and measure effects that are simply not detectable 
in pure – cross section or pure – time series data (Baltagi, 2001; Hsiao, 1986). 
The model under investigation is as follows: 
       
                     (3.2) 
where     is the   
  observation of dependent variable with i=1,…,N (airlines) and 
t=1,…,T (time),   is the constant term and is a K X 1 vector (K is the number of 
explanatory variables),    is the   
  observation on K explanatory variables. 
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          (3.3) 
The term    is the unobserved individual specific effect or individual heterogeneity 
for the airline  . The    is the remainder stochastic disturbance term. If this is valid, 
the model is called as the one-way error component regression model.  
                        (3.4) 
In this case, the   isthe unobserved time effect. It is individual invariant and accounts 
for time-specific effect that is not included in the regression. Others are defined 
above in the (3.3) equation. If this case is valid, the model is called the two-way error 
component regression model.  
We perfomed the time effect tests for each time horizon to determine which model 
could be used. Its null hypothesis is that the time dummies are not jointly significant. 
In accordance with results of the time effect test, we run our regressions with time 
effect or without time effect. That is to say, we determined whether  the one-way 
error component regression model is valid by testing time effect. The results of the 
time effects tests were given in the appendix C. 
In the one-way fixed effects models, the    are assumed to be fixed parameters to be 
estimated and the remainder disturbance stochastic with     independent and 
identically distributed IID (0,   
 ). The     are assumed to be independent of the 
   for all i and t. On the other hand, in the one-way random effects models,     ~ IID 
(0,   
  ,     ~ IID (0,   
 ) and the    are independent of the    . In addition, the     
are independent of the    and     for all i and t (Baltagi, 2001). 
In the two-way fixed effects models, the   and    are assumed to be fixed parameters 
to be estimated and remainder disturbances are stochastic with     ~ IID (0,   
 ). The 
    are assumed independent of the     for all i and t. On the contrary, if    ~ IID (0, 
  
  ,    ~ IID (0,   
 ) and     ~ IID (0,   
 ) independent of each other, the two-way 
random effects model is valid. In addition,     is independent of  ,      and     for all 
i and t (Baltagi, 2001). 
We also tested for the fixed effect model versus the pooled OLS and the random 
effects models. The fixed effect model versus the pooled OLS is tested via an F-test. 
Its null hypothesis is that the fixed effect model is preferred to the pooled OLS. To 
decide between the fixed or random effects we run a Hausman test for each 
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model.The null hypothesis is that the differences in coefficients are not systematic. If 
the null hypothesis was rejected, we used the fixed effect model; otherwise, the 
random effects model was valid. According to the Hausman test, all models should 
be estimated by using the fixed effects methodology out of the second model. Its 
Hausman test statistic χ2was negative. Schreiber (2008) showed that the Hausman 
chi-square test statistic may be negative not only in small samples but even 
asymtotically as well. On the other hand, the fixed effect model was preferred to the 
pooled OLS with respect to the F-tests for all models. The results of F-tests and 
Hausman tests were given in the appendix B and A, respectively. 
The fixed effects model is a suitable specification if we are concentrate a specific set 
of N firms and our inference limited to the behavior of these set of firm (Baltagi, 
2001). In line with Baltagi (2001), the second model was also estimated by using the 
fixed effect methodology. 
After identifying the probable models, we tested the groupwise heteroskedasticity, 
autocorrelation and cross-sectional dependence. The results of these tests were given 
in the appendix D, E and F, respectively. In accordance with these tests’ results, all 
models were estimated with fixed effect methodology with Driscoll-Kraay standart 
errors by using STATA 11. 
3.3.1 Estimations of Panel Data Models 
As shown in Table 3.9, the performance of our models is relatively good as indicated 
with-in R-squared. Table 3.9 presents the main results obtained from the estimation 
of the effect of aircraft fuel hedging activities on airline firm value.  
We found weak and statistically insignificant relation between hedging dummy and 
firm value for all periods except the period of 2007-2011. Consistent with Jin and 
Jorion (2006), hedging has no perceptible effect on firm value for the U.S. major 
passenger airlines. However, hedging aircraft fuel exposure with derivatives shows 
negative and statistically significant at the 10% level during the period of 2007-2011 
consistent with the findings of Nguyen and Faff (2010) and Khediri and Folus (2010) 
which proposed hedging discount rather than hedging premium. This result shows us 
that the U.S. major passenger airlines that prefer to use aircraft fuel hedging with 
derivatives have on average a 11.28% lower value than those that do not prefer to use 
them over the period of 2007-2011. 
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On the other hand, the estimated coefficients for the percentage of next year’s fuel 
requirements hedged are positive and statistically significant at the 5% level for the 
periods of 2002-2011 and 2006-2011. However, these coefficients are at least 
positive but statistically insignificant for the periods of 2007-2011 and 2008-20011.  
In the case of Model 1, the coefficent of 0.2598 can be interpreted by declaring that 
an airline that hedges 100% of its aircraft fuel requirements would be anticipated to 
have value premium of almost 26% over an airline hedges non of its aircraft fuel 
requirements. The average percentage of next year’s fuel requirements hedged was 
34.78% during the period 2002-2011. Hence, for those airlines in our sample, on 
average,an airline exhibits a value premium of around 9% [0.2598*0.3478] by 
implementing hedging strategies. The value premium is 7.34%, 3.99% and 4% for 
periods of 2006-2011, 2007-2011 and 2008-2011, respectively. As a comparison 
with Carter et al. (2003, 2006), they deduced that the hedging premium constitutes 
about a 12-16% and 5-10% increase in firm value, respectively. 
Although the hedging discount was valid with hedging dummy for the period of 
2007-2011, the hedging premium results was documented with the next year’s 
aircraft fuel requirements variable for the same period. At first glance, the results of 
two different hedging variables seem to contradict. However, this is not the case. If 
they had not hedged their fuel expense, their firm value would have been decreased 
more than the actual situation. For instance, the percentage of the hedging discount 
reported was approximately -11% for the period of 2007-2011. Had they not used 
any hedging instruments, this percentage would have been lower than -11%. 
Most of the coefficients for the control variables are strong and statistically 
significant. Only one control variable, ROA, has a weak and statistically insignificant 
but positive relation documented for all models.  
Consistent with Allayannis and Weston (2001) and Carter et al. (2003), the estimates 
for firm size are always negative and highly significant except the second model. In 
the U.S. major passenger airlines, becoming larger size does not provide advantages, 
with respect to firm value. 
In contrast to Carter et al. (2003), the estimated parameters of the dividend dummy 
are negative and statistically significant out of the second model. This results are 
consistent with Allayannis and Weston (2001) and Khediri and Folus (2010). Our 
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result suggest that airlines in our sample does not use dividends to signal their 
management competence and financial austerity. 
The parameter estimates for the leverage variable are positive and highly statistically 
significant in all models as opposed to Allayannis and Weston (2001) and Carter et 
al. (2003). The coefficients of the ratio of capital expenditures to sales are 
statistically significant for all models out of the model8, and their signs are negative 
for the model3, the model4 and the model5.  
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Table 3. 9 : Panel Data Estimations of the Relation Between Firm Value and Aircraft Fuel Hedging Behavior for U.S. Major Passenger Airlines 
  2002-2011 2006-2011 2007-2011 2008-2011 
 Ln(Tobin's Q) Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 
LnTA -0.1378* -0.1486 -0.2879** -0.3705*** -0.2325** -0.4071*** -0.3909** -0.4606*** 
DD -0.1781*** -0.1005 -0.2276*** -0.1818*** -0.1644*** -0.2085*** -0.1627*** -0.1144** 
Leverage 0.5569** 0.7896** 0.9943*** 1.2776*** 1.0416*** 1.3557*** 0.5068** 0.3902*** 
ROA 0.5142 0.4917 0.1396 0.1644 -0.1273 0.1334 0.1569 0.2166 
CapExtoSales 0.5845*** 0.4523** -0.1943** -0.2807* -0.2340** 0.1901* 0.3427* 0.5652 
HD -0.0363 
 
-0.0051 
 
-0.1128* 
 
0.001 
 
NextHedged 
 
0.2598** 
(9.03%)  
0.2477** 
(7.34%)  
0.1402 
(3.99%)  
0.1375 
(4.00%) 
2007 
  
-0.1483*** -0.1196*** 
    2008 
  
-0.0738** -0.0569** 
 
0.0603** 
  2009 
  
-0.1216*** -0.1044*** 
 
0.0182 
  2010 
  
-0.0842** -0.0513** 
 
0.1085*** 
  2011 
  
-0.053 0.0038 
 
0.1373*** 
  Cons 3.2297* 3.2703 6.4762** 8.1401*** 5.2285** 8.8523*** 8.9362** 10.5170*** 
F 138.96 149.83 26.01 1702.83 1248.40 53169.25 5.08 4.47 
Prob> F 0.000 0.000 0.0001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0153 0.0225 
With-in R-squared 0.5488 0.5969 0.6002 0.6560 0.5062 0.6437 0.4344 0.4565 
All models were estimated by using Fixed Effect Model by using Driscoll-KraayStandart Errors. ***, **, * indicates a significance  at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively. Actual 
hedging premium (or discount) are reported in the parentheses. 
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3.3.2. Estimations of  the Dynamic Panel Data Models 
As stated in Baltagi (2005), many economic relationships are in dynamic nature and 
panel data is to allow the researcher to better understand the dynamics of 
adjustments. The dynamic relationships can be characterized by adding lagged 
dependent variable among the regressors. It is as follows: 
                                         (3.5) 
Where   is a scalar,     is 1 X K and   is K X 1. Further explanation was given in 
the section 3.3. 
The rationale of using lagged dependent variable among the regressors is to 
incorporate possible effects of the previous year’s firm value. A firm that have high 
firm value in the previous year is expected to have also high firm value at the 
following year. All models were estimated by using the balancedfixed effecst 
methodology with Driscoll-Kraay standart errors and time effects dummy. If the time 
dummies are not jointly significant, we excluded them from the models. 
In Table 3.10, we documented negative but weak and statistically insignificant 
relation between hedging dummy and firm value over all periods out of the period of 
2008-2011. These results resemble to the outcome of the previous models and are 
consistent with Jin and Jorion (2006).On the contrary, there is a positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level relationship between hedging dummy and firm 
value for the period of 2008-2011 consistent with the Allayannis and Weston (2001) 
and Carter et al. (2003, 2006). According to this results, those airlines in our sample 
that prefer to use aircraft fuel hedging with derivatives have on average a 7% higher 
value than those that do not prefer to use then over the period of 2008-2011.  
On the other hand, the estimated coefficients for the percentage of next year’s fuel 
requirements hedged are positive and statistically significant at the 5% level for the 
periods of 2002-2011 and 2006-2011. However, these coefficients are at least 
positive but statistically insignificant for the periods of 2007-2011 and 2008-20011.  
As shown in the Model 9, the coefficent of 0.2676 can be interpreted by declaring 
that an airline that hedges 100% of its aircraft fuel requirements would be anticipated 
to have value premium of almost 26% over an airline hedges non of its aircraft fuel 
requirements. The average percentage of next year’s fuel requirements hedged was 
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34.78% during the period 2002-2011. Hence, for those airlines in our sample, on 
average, an airline exhibits a value premium of around 9.30% [0.2676*0.3478] by 
implemeting hedging strategies. The value premium is 6.13%, 2.94% and 6.72% for 
periods of 2006-2011, 2007-2011 and 2008-2011, respectively.  
Consistent with Allayannis and Weston (2001) and Carter et al. (2003), the 
coefficients of the firm size are always negative and highly significant for all models. 
In contrast to Carter et al. (2003), the estimated parameter of the dividend dummy 
are negative and fairly significant for all models. This results are consistent with 
Allayannis and Weston (2001) and Khediri and Folus (2010). The parameter 
estimates for the leverage variable are positive and statistically significant in all 
models as opposed to Allayannis and Weston (2001) and Carter et al. (2003). The 
coefficients of the return on assets are positive for all models, moreover, they are 
statistically significant at the 5% level for the model14 and the model15.  
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Table 3. 10 : Dynamic Panel Data Estimations of the Relation Between Firm Value and Aircraft Fuel Hedging Behavior for U.S. Major Passenger Airlines 
  2002-2011 2006-2011 2007-2011 2008-2011 
 
Model9 Model10 Model11 Model12 Model13 Model14 Model15 Model16 
LnTobin'sQ 
        LagLnTobinQ 0,1426 0,143 -0.2494*** -0.1790*** -0.2424*** -0.2146*** -0,0787 -0,1273 
LnTA -0.1475** -0.1569** -0.2554** -0.3840*** -0.4826*** -0.5091*** -0.5146*** -0.7058*** 
DD -0.1660*** -0,0865 -0.2158*** -0.1930*** -0.2656*** -0.2391*** -0.2547*** -0.1931*** 
Leverage 0.4770** 0.7042** 1.2038*** 1.3276*** 1.3577*** 1.4214*** 1.1781*** 0.9491*** 
ROA 0,3643 0,307 0,2038 0,2347 0,2476 0.2669** 0.1055** 0,052 
CapExtoSales 0.5190** 0.3889** -0.3822*** -0.3254* 0,0675 0,1429 0.2399** 0.5995** 
HD -0,0307 
 
-0,0322 
 
-0,0175 
 
0.0699*** 
 
NextHedged 
 
0.2676** 
(9.30%)  
0.2068** 
(6.13%)  
0.1031 
(2.94%)  
0.231 
(6.72%) 
2007 
  
-0.1243*** -0.0916*** 
    2008 
  
-0.1078*** -0,0611 0.0625*** 0.0651*** 
  2009 
  
-0.1323*** -0.0920** 0.0424*** 0.0398*** -0.0090*** 0,0137 
2010 
  
-0.1104** -0,0477 0.1209*** 0.1269*** 0.0865*** 0.1034*** 
2011 
  
-0,0821 0,0046 0.1504*** 0.1625*** 0.1021*** .1346*** 
Cons 3.4315** 3,4465 5.7662** 8.4595*** 10.65245*** 11.1677*** 11.4439*** 15.8535*** 
F 515,17 961,4 104,82 253,89 189,33 219,83 145,01 400,76 
Prob> F 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
With-in R-squared 0,5687 0,6197 0,6527 0,6813 0,6823 0,6905 0,5986 0,6423 
All models were estimated by using Fixed Effect Model by using Driscoll-KraayStandart Errors. ***, **, * indicates a significance  at the 1, 5 and 10% levels repectively. Actual hedging 
premium (or discount) are reported in the parentheses. 
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4. CONCLUSION 
This study examined the aircraft fuel hedging behavior of the U.S. major passenger 
airlines during the periods of 2002-2011, 2006-2011, 2007-2011 and 2008-2011. One 
of the goals of this study is to analyze whether airlines’ aircraft fuel hedging 
strategies affect firms’ values for such time horizons. We evaluated the relation 
between firms’ values and the percentage of next year’s fuel requirements hedged. 
Our study is the first examination of the relation between aircraft hedging and firm 
value of the U.S. major passenger airlines. We updated the results of previous 
research of Carter et al. (2003, 2006) by both following new sampling method and 
taking different time periods which are the periods of  2002-2011, 2006-2011, 2007-
2011 and 2008-2011 due to the application of fresh-start reporting in contrast to the 
periods of 1994-2000 and 1992-2002 examined by Carter et al. (2003, 2006), 
respectively. 
Consistent with Jin and Jorion (2006), hedging has no perceptible effect on firm 
value for the U.S. major passenger airlines over all time periods out of the period of 
2007-2011. However, hedging with aircraft fuel exposure with derivatives shows 
negative and statistically significant at the 10% level during the period of 2007-2011. 
Airlines that prefer to use aircraft fuel hedging with derivatives have on average a 
11.28% lower value than airlines that do not prefer to use them. This result is 
consistent with Nyguyen and Faff (2010) that proposed the hedging discount. The 
estimated coefficients for the percentage of next year’s fuel requirements hedged are 
positive and statistically significant at the 5% level for the periods of 2002-2011 and 
2006-2011. However, these coefficients are at least positive and statistically 
insignificant for the periods of 2007-2011 and 2008-20011. The value premium is 
9%, 7.34%, 3.99% and 4% for periods of 2002-2011, 2006-2011, 2007-2011 and 
2008-2011, respectively. 
At first glance, the results of two different hedging variables seem to contradict. 
However, if they had not hedged their fuel expense, their firm value would have been 
decreased more than the actual situation. For instance, the percentage of the hedging 
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discount reported was approximately -11% for the period of 2007-2011. Had they not 
used any hedging instruments, this percentage would have been lower than -11%. 
On the other hand, the dynamic models were estimated by adding lagged dependent 
variable among the regressors in order to incorporate possible effects of the previous 
year’s firm value. All dynamic models were estimated by using the balanced fixed 
effecst model with Driscoll-Kraay standart errors and time effects dummy. If the 
time dummies are not jointly significant, we excluded them from the models. 
Similar to previous model, we documented negative but weak and statistically 
insignificant relation between hedging dummy and firm value over all periods out of 
the period of 2008-2011. These results resemble to the outcome of the previous 
models and are consistent with Jin and Jorion (2006). On the contrary, there is a 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level relationship between hedging 
dummy and firm value for the period of 2008-2011 consistent with the Allayannis 
and Weston (2001) and Carter et al. (2003, 2006). According to this results, those 
airlines in our sample that prefer to use aircraft fuel hedging with derivatives have on 
average a 7% higher value than those that do not prefer to use then over the period of 
2008-2011. The estimated coefficients for the percentage of next year’s fuel 
requirements hedged are positive and statistically significant at the 5% level for the 
periods of 2002-2011 and 2006-2011. However, these coefficients are at least 
positive but statistically insignificant for the periods of 2007-2011 and 2008-20011. 
The value premium is 9.30%, 6.13%, 2.94% and 6.72% for periods of 2002-2011, 
2006-2011, 2007-2011 and 2008-2011, respectively.  
Further analysis should be undertaken to comprehend the precise relationships 
between firm value and hedging activities for both different industries and countries. 
Cross-country analysis should be certainly made in order to investigate whether the 
use of derivatives affects firm value. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A : Results of Hausman Tests 
 
Table A.1 :Hausman Test for the period of 2002-2011 with HD 
 
Table A.2 :Hausman Test for the period of 2002-2011 with NextHedged 
 
Table A.3 :Hausman Test for the period of 2006-2011 with HD 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =       38.07
                  chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
          HD     -.0363061     .0152048       -.0515109               .
CapExtoSales      .5845842     .7074191       -.1228349        .1025371
         ROA      .5142995     .3857364        .1285631               .
    Leverage      .5569884     .5517894         .005199        .1920017
          DD      -.178193     .3298428       -.5080358        .0999822
        LnTA     -.1378852    -.0583239       -.0795613        .0505652
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
                                        see suest for a generalized test
                                        assumptions of the Hausman test;
                                        data fails to meet the asymptotic
                          =  -430.73    chi2<0 ==> model fitted on these
                  chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
  NextHedged      .2598607     .3394176       -.0795569               .
CapExtoSales      .4523648     .5929765       -.1406117        .1006053
         ROA      .4917811     .4011565        .0906246               .
    Leverage      .7896355      .942499       -.1528635        .1177743
          DD     -.1005529     .3054888       -.4060417        .0998387
        LnTA     -.1486528    -.0370351       -.1116177        .0463028
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0023
                          =       20.49
                  chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
          HD     -.0509863    -.0007637       -.0502226               .
CapExtoSales     -.0311059     .2778227       -.3089286               .
         ROA       .006008     .0111881       -.0051801               .
    Leverage      .8218629     .9406322       -.1187693        .1742212
          DD     -.1905026     .0420671       -.2325696        .0362995
        LnTA     -.3365023    -.0000586       -.3364437        .1181315
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
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Table A.4 :Hausman Test for the period of 2006-2011 with NextHedged 
 
Table A.5 :Hausman Test for the period of 2007-2011 with HD 
 
Table A.6 :Hausman Test for the period of 2007-2011 with NextHedged 
 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0002
                          =       25.77
                  chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
  NextHedged      .2410133     .3519099       -.1108966               .
CapExtoSales     -.1470325     .1606718       -.3077042               .
         ROA      .0671429     .0057307        .0614122               .
    Leverage      1.136904     1.253094       -.1161896        .1737438
          DD     -.1089913      .155088       -.2640793        .0597987
        LnTA     -.3371918      .007434       -.3446258        .1131421
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0018
                          =       21.03
                  chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
          HD     -.1128568    -.0267916       -.0860652               .
CapExtoSales     -.2340681     .2531796       -.4872477               .
         ROA     -.1273805    -.1082046       -.0191759               .
    Leverage      1.041617     .8582228        .1833944        .2153158
          DD     -.1644979     .1590496       -.3235475        .0461349
        LnTA     -.2325992     .0121892       -.2447884        .1255761
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0024
                          =       20.36
                  chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
  NextHedged      .0406498     .3030171       -.2623673               .
CapExtoSales     -.2781368     .3055485       -.5836853               .
         ROA     -.0123895    -.0294136        .0170241               .
    Leverage      1.210239     1.100943        .1092963        .2278908
          DD     -.1503852     .2153032       -.3656883        .0764029
        LnTA     -.2111763     .0155931       -.2267693        .1306831
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
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Table A.7 :Hausman Test for the period of 2008-2011 with HD 
 
Table A.8 :Hausman Test for the period of 2008-2011 with NextHedged 
APPENDIX B : Results of F Tests 
 
Table B.1 : F test for the period of 2002-2011 with HD 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =      224.71
                  chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
          HD      .0016818     .0833007        -.081619               .
CapExtoSales      .3427843     .1660206        .1767638        .1818295
         ROA      .1569654     .1972468       -.0402814               .
    Leverage      .5068097     .8193921       -.3125824        .2875575
          DD     -.1627207     .0956698       -.2583905         .038017
        LnTA     -.3909016      .010214       -.4011156        .1628936
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =       30.37
                  chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
  NextHedged      .1375062     .3218719       -.1843657        .0285729
CapExtoSales      .5652837     .5291681        .0361156        .3002149
         ROA      .2166267     .2649663       -.0483397               .
    Leverage      .3902168     .9887023       -.5984854        .3182678
          DD     -.1144675     .2365646        -.351032        .0713363
        LnTA     -.4606873     .0205663       -.4812537        .1701776
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
F test that all u_i=0:     F(5, 48) =     9.01               Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .85458391   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .11232601
     sigma_u    .27230239
                                                                              
       _cons     3.229724   1.266613     2.55   0.014     .6830282    5.776419
          HD    -.0363061   .0845409    -0.43   0.670    -.2062871    .1336748
CapExtoSales     .5845842   .1681605     3.48   0.001     .2464748    .9226935
         ROA     .5142995   .4499528     1.14   0.259    -.3903912     1.41899
    Leverage     .5569884   .3156143     1.76   0.084    -.0775966    1.191573
          DD     -.178193   .1206476    -1.48   0.146    -.4207712    .0643852
        LnTA    -.1378852    .055585    -2.48   0.017    -.2496463    -.026124
                                                                              
    LnTobinQ        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.6608                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(6,48)            =      9.73
       overall = 0.1511                                        max =        10
       between = 0.0681                                        avg =      10.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.5488                         Obs per group: min =        10
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =         6
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =        60
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Table B.2 : F Test for the period of 2002-2011 with NexHedged 
 
Table B.3 : F Test for the period of 2006-2011 with HD 
 
Table B.3 : F Test for the period of 2006-2011 with NextHedged 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(5, 48) =     8.87               Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .84374103   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .10617567
     sigma_u    .24672156
                                                                              
       _cons     3.270397   1.192022     2.74   0.009     .8736767    5.667118
  NextHedged     .2598607   .1067266     2.43   0.019     .0452725    .4744488
CapExtoSales     .4523648    .165669     2.73   0.009     .1192649    .7854646
         ROA     .4917811   .4241099     1.16   0.252     -.360949    1.344511
    Leverage     .7896355   .2953573     2.67   0.010     .1957798    1.383491
          DD    -.1005529   .1184369    -0.85   0.400    -.3386863    .1375804
        LnTA    -.1486528   .0517347    -2.87   0.006    -.2526725   -.0446331
                                                                              
    LnTobinQ        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.6218                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(6,48)            =     11.85
       overall = 0.2415                                        max =        10
       between = 0.1502                                        avg =      10.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.5969                         Obs per group: min =        10
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =         6
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =        60
F test that all u_i=0:     F(7, 34) =     9.12               Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .95689532   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .10254899
     sigma_u    .48317161
                                                                              
       _cons     7.573983   3.014598     2.51   0.017     1.447582    13.70038
          HD    -.0509863   .0992636    -0.51   0.611    -.2527143    .1507417
CapExtoSales    -.0311059   .2759269    -0.11   0.911    -.5918568     .529645
         ROA      .006008   .2983664     0.02   0.984    -.6003456    .6123616
    Leverage     .8218629   .3896734     2.11   0.042     .0299513    1.613775
          DD    -.1905026   .1126632    -1.69   0.100    -.4194617    .0384565
        LnTA    -.3365023   .1298656    -2.59   0.014     -.600421   -.0725836
                                                                              
    LnTobinQ        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9245                        Prob > F           =    0.0016
                                                F(6,34)            =      4.63
       overall = 0.0230                                        max =         6
       between = 0.0870                                        avg =       6.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.4494                         Obs per group: min =         6
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =         8
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =        48
F test that all u_i=0:     F(7, 34) =     6.38               Prob > F = 0.0001
                                                                              
         rho    .95825794   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .09684742
     sigma_u    .46402601
                                                                              
       _cons     7.360135   2.775415     2.65   0.012     1.719812    13.00046
  NextHedged     .2410133   .1146782     2.10   0.043     .0079592    .4740674
CapExtoSales    -.1470325   .2661445    -0.55   0.584    -.6879033    .3938383
         ROA     .0671429   .2616396     0.26   0.799    -.4645727    .5988586
    Leverage     1.136904   .3613654     3.15   0.003     .4025213    1.871287
          DD    -.1089913   .1132752    -0.96   0.343    -.3391942    .1212115
        LnTA    -.3371918   .1207618    -2.79   0.009    -.5826092   -.0917744
                                                                              
    LnTobinQ        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9135                        Prob > F           =    0.0003
                                                F(6,34)            =      5.87
       overall = 0.0050                                        max =         6
       between = 0.0432                                        avg =       6.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.5090                         Obs per group: min =         6
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =         8
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =        48
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Table B.4 : F Test for the period of 2007-2011 with HD 
 
Table B. 5 : F Test for the period of 2007-2011 with NextHedged 
 
Table B.6 : F Test for the period of 2008-2011 with HD 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(8, 30) =     9.22               Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .94314071   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .08850743
     sigma_u    .36046843
                                                                              
       _cons     5.228517   3.041377     1.72   0.096    -.9828035    11.43984
          HD    -.1128568   .0902549    -1.25   0.221     -.297182    .0714684
CapExtoSales    -.2340681   .3694883    -0.63   0.531    -.9886639    .5205277
         ROA    -.1273805   .2279477    -0.56   0.580    -.5929119    .3381509
    Leverage     1.041617   .3792357     2.75   0.010     .2671146     1.81612
          DD    -.1644979   .0997472    -1.65   0.110    -.3682088     .039213
        LnTA    -.2325992   .1303531    -1.78   0.084    -.4988158    .0336174
                                                                              
    LnTobinQ        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.8863                        Prob > F           =    0.0010
                                                F(6,30)            =      5.13
       overall = 0.0061                                        max =         5
       between = 0.0563                                        avg =       5.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.5062                         Obs per group: min =         5
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =         9
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =        45
F test that all u_i=0:     F(8, 30) =     5.76               Prob > F = 0.0002
                                                                              
         rho    .93392653   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .09064257
     sigma_u    .34078069
                                                                              
       _cons     4.567195   3.094703     1.48   0.150    -1.753032    10.88742
  NextHedged     .0406498   .1325326     0.31   0.761    -.2300178    .3113174
CapExtoSales    -.2781368   .3791601    -0.73   0.469    -1.052485    .4962115
         ROA    -.0123895   .2181449    -0.06   0.955    -.4579009    .4331219
    Leverage     1.210239   .3701377     3.27   0.003     .4543171    1.966161
          DD    -.1503852   .1129812    -1.33   0.193    -.3811235    .0803532
        LnTA    -.2111763   .1343281    -1.57   0.126    -.4855109    .0631584
                                                                              
    LnTobinQ        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.8726                        Prob > F           =    0.0019
                                                F(6,30)            =      4.65
       overall = 0.0022                                        max =         5
       between = 0.0397                                        avg =       5.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.4821                         Obs per group: min =         5
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =         9
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =        45
F test that all u_i=0:     F(9, 24) =     7.70               Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .97567618   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .07910783
     sigma_u    .50102156
                                                                              
       _cons     8.936229   3.904217     2.29   0.031     .8783222    16.99414
          HD     .0016818   .0926194     0.02   0.986    -.1894752    .1928387
CapExtoSales     .3427843   .5595787     0.61   0.546    -.8121293    1.497698
         ROA     .1569654   .2060909     0.76   0.454    -.2683853    .5823161
    Leverage     .5068097   .4202676     1.21   0.240    -.3605801    1.374199
          DD    -.1627207   .0922416    -1.76   0.090    -.3530981    .0276567
        LnTA    -.3909016   .1662812    -2.35   0.027    -.7340892    -.047714
                                                                              
    LnTobinQ        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9510                        Prob > F           =    0.0224
                                                F(6,24)            =      3.07
       overall = 0.0058                                        max =         4
       between = 0.0188                                        avg =       4.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.4344                         Obs per group: min =         4
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =        10
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =        40
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Table B.7 : F Test for the period of 2008-2011 with NextHedged 
 
APPENDIX C :Results ofTime Effect Tests 
 
Table C.1 : Time Effect Test for the period of 2002-2011 with HD 
 
Table C.2 : Time Effect Test for the period of 2002-2011 with NextHedged 
 
 
Table C.3 : Time Effect Test for the period of 2006-2011 with HD 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(9, 24) =     6.07               Prob > F = 0.0002
                                                                              
         rho    .98206222   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e     .0775454
     sigma_u    .57377441
                                                                              
       _cons     10.51708   3.989088     2.64   0.014     2.284007    18.75015
  NextHedged     .1375062      .1391     0.99   0.333    -.1495821    .4245946
CapExtoSales     .5652837   .5774089     0.98   0.337    -.6264297    1.756997
         ROA     .2166267   .1937463     1.12   0.275     -.183246    .6164993
    Leverage     .3902168   .4139787     0.94   0.355    -.4641932    1.244627
          DD    -.1144675   .1027368    -1.11   0.276    -.3265059    .0975709
        LnTA    -.4606873     .17192    -2.68   0.013    -.8155127    -.105862
                                                                              
    LnTobinQ        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9626                        Prob > F           =    0.0151
                                                F(6,24)            =      3.36
       overall = 0.0042                                        max =         4
       between = 0.0141                                        avg =       4.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.4565                         Obs per group: min =         4
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =        10
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =        40
            Prob > F =    0.5739
       F(  9,    39) =    0.85
 ( 9)  _It_2011 = 0
 ( 8)  _It_2010 = 0
 ( 7)  _It_2009 = 0
 ( 6)  _It_2008 = 0
 ( 5)  _It_2007 = 0
 ( 4)  _It_2006 = 0
 ( 3)  _It_2005 = 0
 ( 2)  _It_2004 = 0
 ( 1)  _It_2003 = 0
i.t               _It_2002-2011       (naturally coded; _It_2002 omitted)
            Prob > F =    0.4611
       F(  9,    39) =    0.99
 ( 9)  _It_2011 = 0
 ( 8)  _It_2010 = 0
 ( 7)  _It_2009 = 0
 ( 6)  _It_2008 = 0
 ( 5)  _It_2007 = 0
 ( 4)  _It_2006 = 0
 ( 3)  _It_2005 = 0
 ( 2)  _It_2004 = 0
 ( 1)  _It_2003 = 0
i.t               _It_2002-2011       (naturally coded; _It_2002 omitted)
            Prob > F =    0.0830
       F(  5,    29) =    2.19
 ( 5)  _It_2011 = 0
 ( 4)  _It_2010 = 0
 ( 3)  _It_2009 = 0
 ( 2)  _It_2008 = 0
 ( 1)  _It_2007 = 0
i.t               _It_2006-2011       (naturally coded; _It_2006 omitted)
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Table C.4 : Time Effect Test for the period of 2006-2011 with NextHedged 
 
Table C.5 : Time Effect Test for the period of 2007-2011 with HD 
 
Table C.6 : Time Effect Test for the period of 2007-2011 with NextHedged 
 
Table C.7 : Time Effect Test for the period of 2008-2011 with HD 
 
Table C.8 : Time Effect Test for the period of 2008-2011 with NextHedged 
 
 
 
            Prob > F =    0.0549
       F(  5,    29) =    2.48
 ( 5)  _It_2011 = 0
 ( 4)  _It_2010 = 0
 ( 3)  _It_2009 = 0
 ( 2)  _It_2008 = 0
 ( 1)  _It_2007 = 0
i.t               _It_2006-2011       (naturally coded; _It_2006 omitted)
            Prob > F =    0.1109
       F(  4,    26) =    2.09
 ( 4)  _It_2011 = 0
 ( 3)  _It_2010 = 0
 ( 2)  _It_2009 = 0
 ( 1)  _It_2008 = 0
i.t               _It_2007-2011       (naturally coded; _It_2007 omitted)
            Prob > F =    0.0391
       F(  4,    26) =    2.95
 ( 4)  _It_2011 = 0
 ( 3)  _It_2010 = 0
 ( 2)  _It_2009 = 0
 ( 1)  _It_2008 = 0
i.t               _It_2007-2011       (naturally coded; _It_2007 omitted)
            Prob > F =    0.2125
       F(  3,    21) =    1.63
 ( 3)  _It_2011 = 0
 ( 2)  _It_2010 = 0
 ( 1)  _It_2009 = 0
i.t               _It_2008-2011       (naturally coded; _It_2008 omitted)
            Prob > F =    0.1793
       F(  3,    21) =    1.79
 ( 3)  _It_2011 = 0
 ( 2)  _It_2010 = 0
 ( 1)  _It_2009 = 0
i.t               _It_2008-2011       (naturally coded; _It_2008 omitted)
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APPENDIX D :Results of Modified Wald Test for Groupwise Heteroskedasticity 
 
Table D.1 : Modified Wald Test for the period of 2002-2011 with HD 
 
 
Table D. 2 : Modified Wald Test for the period of 2002-2011 with NextHedged 
 
Table D.3 : Modified Wald Test for the period of 2006-2011 with HD 
 
Table D.4 : Modified Wald Test for the period of 2006-2011 with NextHedged 
 
Table D.5 : Modified Wald Test for the period of 2007-2011 with HD 
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
chi2 (6)  =       73.46
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i
in fixed effect regression model
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
chi2 (6)  =       55.68
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i
in fixed effect regression model
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
chi2 (8)  =      137.90
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i
in fixed effect regression model
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
chi2 (8)  =      569.75
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i
in fixed effect regression model
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
chi2 (9)  =       81.16
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i
in fixed effect regression model
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity
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Table D.6: Modified Wald Test for the period of 2007-2011 with NextHedged 
 
Table D.7 : Modified Wald Test for the period of 2008-2011 with HD 
 
Table D.7 : Modified Wald Test for the period of 2008-2011 with NextHedged 
 
APPENDIX E : Results of Autocorrelation Tests 
 
Table E.1 : Autocorrelation Test for the period of 2002-2011 with HD 
 
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
chi2 (9)  =      432.52
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i
in fixed effect regression model
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
chi2 (10)  =     768.94
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i
in fixed effect regression model
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
chi2 (10)  =     402.54
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i
in fixed effect regression model
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity
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Table E.2 : Autocorrelation Test for the period of 2002-2011 with NextHedged 
 
 
Table E.3 : Autocorrelation Test for the period of 2006-2011 with HD 
Baltagi-Wu LBI = 1.555878
modified Bhargava et al. Durbin-Watson = 1.2550181
F test that all u_i=0:     F(5,42) =     8.72                Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
     rho_fov    .97491556   (fraction of variance because of u_i)
     sigma_e    .08568675
     sigma_u    .53418902
      rho_ar    .48127096
                                                                              
       _cons     11.69481   1.206108     9.70   0.000     9.260782    14.12883
  NextHedged     .1951352   .0947808     2.06   0.046     .0038598    .3864106
CapExtoSales     .1985773   .2361026     0.84   0.405     -.277897    .6750517
         ROA     .0765434    .310922     0.25   0.807    -.5509225    .7040093
    Leverage     .4930229   .2890786     1.71   0.095    -.0903614    1.076407
          DD    -.1410223   .0979915    -1.44   0.158    -.3387772    .0567326
        LnTA     -.511061   .1010827    -5.06   0.000    -.7150541    -.307068
                                                                              
    LnTobinQ        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9079                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(6,42)            =      8.20
       overall = 0.1387                                        max =         9
       between = 0.0990                                        avg =       9.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.5396                         Obs per group: min =         9
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =         6
FE (within) regression with AR(1) disturbances  Number of obs      =        54
Baltagi-Wu LBI = 2.2597463
modified Bhargava et al. Durbin-Watson = 1.7037671
F test that all u_i=0:     F(7,22) =     8.32                Prob > F = 0.0001
                                                                              
     rho_fov    .97679995   (fraction of variance because of u_i)
     sigma_e    .08611057
     sigma_u    .55874649
      rho_ar    .18372178
                                                                              
       _cons     9.015631   3.295604     2.74   0.012     2.180966     15.8503
    _It_2011    (omitted)
    _It_2010    -.0228354   .0460888    -0.50   0.625    -.1184177    .0727468
    _It_2009    -.0891604   .0605912    -1.47   0.155    -.2148189     .036498
    _It_2008     -.078968   .0613286    -1.29   0.211    -.2061558    .0482198
    _It_2007    -.1170947   .0545171    -2.15   0.043    -.2301562   -.0040331
          HD    -.0566333   .1077909    -0.53   0.605    -.2801779    .1669114
CapExtoSales     .1312379   .4942204     0.27   0.793    -.8937124    1.156188
         ROA    -.1810578   .3382235    -0.54   0.598    -.8824904    .5203749
    Leverage     1.242043   .4582075     2.71   0.013     .2917788    2.192307
          DD    -.2509976   .1113389    -2.25   0.034    -.4819002   -.0200949
        LnTA    -.4043938   .1763709    -2.29   0.032    -.7701645    -.038623
                                                                              
    LnTobinQ        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9452                        Prob > F           =    0.0033
                                                F(10,22)           =      3.99
       overall = 0.0192                                        max =         5
       between = 0.0772                                        avg =       5.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.6444                         Obs per group: min =         5
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =         8
FE (within) regression with AR(1) disturbances  Number of obs      =        40
i.t               _It_2006-2011       (naturally coded; _It_2006 omitted)
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Table E.4 : Autocorrelation Test for the period of 2006-2011 with NextHedged 
 
 
Table E.5 : Autocorrelation Test for the period of 2007-2011 with HD 
Baltagi-Wu LBI = 2.0372609
modified Bhargava et al. Durbin-Watson = 1.5343666
F test that all u_i=0:     F(8,21) =     4.90                Prob > F = 0.0016
                                                                              
     rho_fov    .97672049   (fraction of variance because of u_i)
     sigma_e    .08675396
     sigma_u    .56193686
      rho_ar    .27493233
                                                                              
       _cons     10.54528   3.350743     3.15   0.005     3.577032    17.51353
          HD    -.0052405   .1089457    -0.05   0.962    -.2318054    .2213245
CapExtoSales     .4327933   .6442509     0.67   0.509    -.9069998    1.772586
         ROA    -.0766649   .2084936    -0.37   0.717    -.5102511    .3569214
    Leverage     .4440347   .4318393     1.03   0.316    -.4540242    1.342094
          DD    -.1855045   .1016312    -1.83   0.082    -.3968582    .0258492
        LnTA    -.4627456   .1997349    -2.32   0.031    -.8781171   -.0473742
                                                                              
    LnTobinQ        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9585                        Prob > F           =    0.0404
                                                F(6,21)            =      2.73
       overall = 0.0465                                        max =         4
       between = 0.0953                                        avg =       4.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.4381                         Obs per group: min =         4
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =         9
FE (within) regression with AR(1) disturbances  Number of obs      =        36
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Table E.6 : Autocorrelation Test for the period of 2007-2011 with NextHedged 
 
Table E.7 : Autocorrelation Test for the period of 2008-2011 with HD 
Baltagi-Wu LBI = 2.2535745
modified Bhargava et al. Durbin-Watson = 1.7556085
F test that all u_i=0:     F(9,14) =     4.39                Prob > F = 0.0069
                                                                              
     rho_fov    .96242139   (fraction of variance because of u_i)
     sigma_e    .09208007
     sigma_u    .46599143
      rho_ar    .14758654
                                                                              
       _cons      8.71943   4.974295     1.75   0.101    -1.949371    19.38823
          HD    -.0228468   .1263246    -0.18   0.859    -.2937862    .2480926
CapExtoSales     .0454814   .9758455     0.05   0.963    -2.047499    2.138462
         ROA    -.8669792   .9306694    -0.93   0.367    -2.863067    1.129108
    Leverage     .3553753   .5845695     0.61   0.553    -.8984016    1.609152
          DD    -.2140216   .1218134    -1.76   0.101    -.4752854    .0472422
        LnTA    -.3764337   .2497574    -1.51   0.154      -.91211    .1592426
                                                                              
    LnTobinQ        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9400                        Prob > F           =    0.3241
                                                F(6,14)            =      1.29
       overall = 0.0184                                        max =         3
       between = 0.0382                                        avg =       3.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.3557                         Obs per group: min =         3
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =        10
FE (within) regression with AR(1) disturbances  Number of obs      =        30
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Table E.8 : Autocorrelation Test for the period of 2008-2011 with NextHedged 
 
APPENDIX F : Testing for Cross–Sectional Dependence (Breush-Pagan LM Test) 
 
Table F.1 : Cross Section Dependence Test for the period of 2002-2011 with HD 
 
Table F.2 : Cross Section Dependence Test for the period of 2002-2011 with NextHedged 
 
 
Baltagi-Wu LBI = 2.3040778
modified Bhargava et al. Durbin-Watson = 1.843964
F test that all u_i=0:     F(9,14) =     3.12                Prob > F = 0.0279
                                                                              
     rho_fov    .98236115   (fraction of variance because of u_i)
     sigma_e    .08640494
     sigma_u    .64482078
      rho_ar    .09816235
                                                                              
       _cons     12.77994   5.616987     2.28   0.039     .7327042    24.82718
  NextHedged     .3018542    .209508     1.44   0.172    -.1474958    .7512041
CapExtoSales     .4214349   .9277217     0.45   0.657     -1.56833      2.4112
         ROA    -1.120459   .9702296    -1.15   0.267    -3.201394    .9604769
    Leverage    -.0810207   .6469568    -0.13   0.902    -1.468605    1.306564
          DD    -.0907239   .1361218    -0.67   0.516    -.3826761    .2012283
        LnTA    -.5534404   .2678303    -2.07   0.058    -1.127879    .0209984
                                                                              
    LnTobinQ        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9684                        Prob > F           =    0.1889
                                                F(6,14)            =      1.72
       overall = 0.0102                                        max =         3
       between = 0.0218                                        avg =       3.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.4243                         Obs per group: min =         3
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =        10
FE (within) regression with AR(1) disturbances  Number of obs      =        30
Based on 10 complete observations
Breusch-Pagan LM test of independence: chi2(15) =    16.533, Pr = 0.3475
__e6   0.4149   0.0244  -0.0228   0.3823  -0.0099   1.0000
__e5  -0.0474  -0.3632  -0.7552   0.0726   1.0000
__e4   0.4980  -0.0955   0.1228   1.0000
__e3   0.0830   0.2703   1.0000
__e2   0.5214   1.0000
__e1   1.0000
         __e1     __e2     __e3     __e4     __e5     __e6
Correlation matrix of residuals:
 
Based on 10 complete observations
Breusch-Pagan LM test of independence: chi2(15) =    16.826, Pr = 0.3294
__e6   0.5887  -0.0008   0.0680   0.4108  -0.0813   1.0000
__e5  -0.1511  -0.4387  -0.5981  -0.1242   1.0000
__e4   0.4621  -0.0945   0.1860   1.0000
__e3   0.1207   0.2344   1.0000
__e2   0.4909   1.0000
__e1   1.0000
         __e1     __e2     __e3     __e4     __e5     __e6
Correlation matrix of residuals:
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Table F. 3: Cross Section Dependence Test for the period of 2006-2011 with HD 
 
Table F.4 : Cross Section Dependence Test for the period of 2006-2011 with NextHedged 
 
Table F.5 : Cross Section Dependence Test for the period of 2007-2011 with HD 
 
Table F.6 : Cross Section Dependence Test for the period of 2007-2011 with NextHedged 
Based on 6 complete observations
Breusch-Pagan LM test of independence: chi2(28) =    36.155, Pr = 0.1387
__e8  -0.2368   0.0402  -0.8073  -0.5309  -0.4207   0.8646   0.1477   1.0000
__e7  -0.3486  -0.4235   0.4239  -0.6084  -0.3932   0.3137   1.0000
__e6  -0.6263   0.1273  -0.6743  -0.4965  -0.8122   1.0000
__e5   0.8834  -0.2958   0.2839   0.3458   1.0000
__e4   0.0250  -0.2041   0.0262   1.0000
__e3   0.1785  -0.2340   1.0000
__e2  -0.1336   1.0000
__e1   1.0000
         __e1     __e2     __e3     __e4     __e5     __e6     __e7     __e8
Correlation matrix of residuals:
Based on 6 complete observations
Breusch-Pagan LM test of independence: chi2(28) =    30.163, Pr = 0.3555
__e8  -0.6001  -0.2737  -0.6202  -0.4413  -0.1103   0.7634  -0.0230   1.0000
__e7  -0.0130  -0.2431   0.6551  -0.4180  -0.2575   0.1974   1.0000
__e6  -0.8413   0.2352  -0.3902  -0.5849  -0.5917   1.0000
__e5   0.7737  -0.3199  -0.1650   0.0119   1.0000
__e4   0.0588  -0.3107  -0.0486   1.0000
__e3   0.4447  -0.0119   1.0000
__e2  -0.1135   1.0000
__e1   1.0000
         __e1     __e2     __e3     __e4     __e5     __e6     __e7     __e8
Correlation matrix of residuals:
 
Based on 5 complete observations
Breusch-Pagan LM test of independence: chi2(36) =    38.130, Pr = 0.3728
__e9   0.0368   0.7168   0.0474  -0.7079  -0.0510   0.3395   0.7850   0.2954   1.0000
__e8  -0.2506   0.6966  -0.7106   0.3902  -0.4947  -0.3644   0.4433   1.0000
__e7  -0.5825   0.7884   0.2304  -0.5814  -0.2820  -0.2954   1.0000
__e6   0.9166  -0.0797  -0.1374  -0.3502   0.5528   1.0000
__e5   0.4615   0.0276   0.0852  -0.3453   1.0000
__e4   0.0521  -0.3132  -0.6580   1.0000
__e3  -0.4089  -0.3082   1.0000
__e2  -0.2411   1.0000
__e1   1.0000
         __e1     __e2     __e3     __e4     __e5     __e6     __e7     __e8     __e9
Correlation matrix of residuals:
 
Based on 5 complete observations
Breusch-Pagan LM test of independence: chi2(36) =    38.929, Pr = 0.3393
__e9  -0.2240   0.5948  -0.5674  -0.6912  -0.0009   0.1808   0.3745  -0.2721   1.0000
__e8  -0.1809   0.5487   0.0750   0.6691  -0.7865  -0.7396   0.3174   1.0000
__e7  -0.8644   0.4248   0.2820  -0.4678  -0.2939  -0.7951   1.0000
__e6   0.6791  -0.3167  -0.4919  -0.1336   0.5495   1.0000
__e5  -0.1214  -0.4545  -0.1685  -0.4597   1.0000
__e4   0.4661   0.0285   0.0233   1.0000
__e3  -0.1512  -0.6346   1.0000
__e2  -0.3296   1.0000
__e1   1.0000
         __e1     __e2     __e3     __e4     __e5     __e6     __e7     __e8     __e9
Correlation matrix of residuals:
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Table F.7 : Cross Section Dependence Test for the period of 2008-2011 with HD 
 
Table F.8 : Cross Section Dependence Test for the period of 2008-2011 with NextHedged 
 
APPENDIX G :Estimations of Fixed Effect Models with Driscoll-Kraaystandart errors 
 
Table G.1 : The Output of Model1 
 
Based on 4 complete observations
Breusch-Pagan LM test of independence: chi2(45) =    55.714, Pr = 0.1315
__e10  -0.1177   0.3963  -0.5639   0.3686  -0.9351  -0.3431   0.1214   0.7259   0.3153   1.0000
 __e9  -0.1105   0.9542   0.6056  -0.7647  -0.0048   0.6398   0.6037   0.5020   1.0000
 __e8  -0.7262   0.7151  -0.1592   0.0318  -0.7029  -0.3414  -0.2364   1.0000
 __e7   0.7256   0.3451   0.4074  -0.5482   0.2110   0.8336   1.0000
 __e6   0.4853   0.4089   0.8339  -0.8837   0.6533   1.0000
 __e5   0.2640  -0.1540   0.7760  -0.6374   1.0000
 __e4  -0.0213  -0.6509  -0.9732   1.0000
 __e3  -0.0174   0.5036   1.0000
 __e2  -0.3931   1.0000
 __e1   1.0000
          __e1     __e2     __e3     __e4     __e5     __e6     __e7     __e8     __e9    __e10
Correlation matrix of residuals:
Based on 4 complete observations
Breusch-Pagan LM test of independence: chi2(45) =    49.931, Pr = 0.2838
__e10  -0.0856   0.4892  -0.5298   0.2115  -0.9422  -0.3286   0.3117   0.7313   0.5160   1.0000
 __e9  -0.0653   0.9291  -0.0071  -0.7159  -0.2035   0.6374   0.8360   0.4740   1.0000
 __e8  -0.7354   0.6955   0.1785  -0.0657  -0.6125  -0.0886  -0.0400   1.0000
 __e7   0.4824   0.5790  -0.3389  -0.6053  -0.0645   0.6043   1.0000
 __e6  -0.0623   0.6084   0.5201  -0.9881   0.6244   1.0000
 __e5   0.0144  -0.1786   0.6477  -0.5268   1.0000
 __e4   0.1709  -0.7188  -0.5423   1.0000
 __e3  -0.7483   0.2781   1.0000
 __e2  -0.4296   1.0000
 __e1   1.0000
          __e1     __e2     __e3     __e4     __e5     __e6     __e7     __e8     __e9    __e10
Correlation matrix of residuals:
                                                                              
       _cons     3.229724   1.509651     2.14   0.085     -.650959    7.110406
          HD    -.0363061   .0359467    -1.01   0.359    -.1287101    .0560978
CapExtoSales     .5845842   .1196758     4.88   0.005     .2769476    .8922207
         ROA     .5142995   .4748502     1.08   0.328    -.7063419    1.734941
    Leverage     .5569884   .1651904     3.37   0.020     .1323531    .9816238
          DD     -.178193   .0406331    -4.39   0.007    -.2826437   -.0737423
        LnTA    -.1378852   .0665694    -2.07   0.093    -.3090074     .033237
                                                                              
    LnTobinQ        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Drisc/Kraay
                                                                              
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.5488
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000
Group variable (i): id                           F(  6,     5)     =    138.96
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =         6
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =        60
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Table G.2 : The Output of Model2 
 
Table G.3 : The Output of Model3 
 
Table G.4 : The Output of Model4 
                                                                              
       _cons     3.270397   1.747739     1.87   0.120    -1.222308    7.763103
  NextHedged     .2598607   .0667196     3.89   0.011     .0883525    .4313688
CapExtoSales     .4523648   .1301129     3.48   0.018      .117899    .7868305
         ROA     .4917811   .4198011     1.17   0.294     -.587352    1.570914
    Leverage     .7896355   .2187152     3.61   0.015     .2274101    1.351861
          DD    -.1005529   .0597732    -1.68   0.153    -.2542047    .0530988
        LnTA    -.1486528   .0755028    -1.97   0.106    -.3427389    .0454333
                                                                              
    LnTobinQ        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Drisc/Kraay
                                                                              
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.5969
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000
Group variable (i): id                           F(  6,     5)     =    149.83
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =         6
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =        60
                                                                              
       _cons     6.476241   2.275449     2.85   0.025     1.095659    11.85682
    _It_2011    -.0530332   .0314383    -1.69   0.135    -.1273728    .0213065
    _It_2010    -.0842219   .0252101    -3.34   0.012    -.1438343   -.0246094
    _It_2009    -.1216348    .013575    -8.96   0.000    -.1537346    -.089535
    _It_2008    -.0738366   .0237823    -3.10   0.017    -.1300727   -.0176005
    _It_2007    -.1483933   .0120467   -12.32   0.000    -.1768792   -.1199074
          HD    -.0051484   .0697246    -0.07   0.943    -.1700208    .1597241
CapExtoSales    -.1943236   .0610116    -3.19   0.015    -.3385932    -.050054
         ROA     .1396897   .2974107     0.47   0.653    -.5635748    .8429542
    Leverage     .9943886   .2648181     3.75   0.007     .3681934    1.620584
          DD    -.2276776   .0176409   -12.91   0.000    -.2693916   -.1859636
        LnTA    -.2879705   .0996187    -2.89   0.023    -.5235313   -.0524097
                                                                              
    LnTobinQ        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Drisc/Kraay
                                                                              
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.6002
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0001
Group variable (i): id                           F( 11,     7)     =     26.01
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =         8
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =        48
i.t               _It_2006-2011       (naturally coded; _It_2006 omitted)
                                                                              
       _cons     8.140122   1.324067     6.15   0.000     5.009201    11.27104
    _It_2011     .0038247   .0148119     0.26   0.804    -.0311999    .0388493
    _It_2010    -.0513039   .0195831    -2.62   0.034    -.0976105   -.0049973
    _It_2009     -.104426   .0137084    -7.62   0.000    -.1368414   -.0720107
    _It_2008    -.0569507   .0216439    -2.63   0.034    -.1081304   -.0057711
    _It_2007    -.1196903   .0058436   -20.48   0.000    -.1335083   -.1058723
  NextHedged      .247725   .0861111     2.88   0.024     .0441045    .4513455
CapExtoSales    -.2807898    .141202    -1.99   0.087    -.6146795       .0531
         ROA     .1644067    .215546     0.76   0.471    -.3452785     .674092
    Leverage     1.277635   .1453592     8.79   0.000     .9339152    1.621355
          DD    -.1818336   .0234564    -7.75   0.000    -.2372991   -.1263681
        LnTA    -.3705741   .0568258    -6.52   0.000    -.5049459   -.2362024
                                                                              
    LnTobinQ        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Drisc/Kraay
                                                                              
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.6560
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000
Group variable (i): id                           F( 11,     7)     =   1702.83
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =         8
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =        48
i.t               _It_2006-2011       (naturally coded; _It_2006 omitted)
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Table G.5 : The Ouput of Model5 
 
Table G.6 : The Output of Model6 
 
Table G.7 : The Output of Model7 
 
Table G.8 : The Output of Model8 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     5.228517    1.74769     2.99   0.017     1.198336    9.258698
          HD    -.1128568   .0584272    -1.93   0.090    -.2475902    .0218766
CapExtoSales    -.2340681   .0858901    -2.73   0.026     -.432131   -.0360053
         ROA    -.1273805   .1496118    -0.85   0.419    -.4723859    .2176248
    Leverage     1.041617   .1494054     6.97   0.000     .6970877    1.386147
          DD    -.1644979   .0155321   -10.59   0.000    -.2003151   -.1286807
        LnTA    -.2325992   .0773156    -3.01   0.017    -.4108893   -.0543091
                                                                              
    LnTobinQ        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Drisc/Kraay
                                                                              
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.5062
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000
Group variable (i): id                           F(  6,     8)     =   1248.40
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =         9
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =        45
                                                                              
       _cons     8.852322   2.027702     4.37   0.002     4.176431    13.52821
    _It_2011     .1373205   .0130236    10.54   0.000     .1072882    .1673529
    _It_2010     .1085864   .0102032    10.64   0.000     .0850577     .132115
    _It_2009       .01824   .0119003     1.53   0.164    -.0092021     .045682
    _It_2008     .0603719   .0185207     3.26   0.012      .017663    .1030808
  NextHedged     .1402855   .0791008     1.77   0.114    -.0421212    .3226922
CapExtoSales     .1901951   .0862817     2.20   0.059    -.0087708    .3891611
         ROA     .1334752   .1329358     1.00   0.345    -.1730752    .4400257
    Leverage      1.35577   .1881981     7.20   0.000     .9217845    1.789756
          DD    -.2085894   .0245552    -8.49   0.000    -.2652137   -.1519651
        LnTA    -.4071905   .0875217    -4.65   0.002     -.609016    -.205365
                                                                              
    LnTobinQ        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Drisc/Kraay
                                                                              
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.6437
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000
Group variable (i): id                           F( 10,     8)     =  53169.25
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =         9
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =        45
i.t               _It_2007-2011       (naturally coded; _It_2007 omitted)
                                                                              
       _cons     8.936229   3.078306     2.90   0.018     1.972618    15.89984
          HD     .0016818    .034776     0.05   0.962    -.0769871    .0803506
CapExtoSales     .3427843   .1689177     2.03   0.073    -.0393342    .7249028
         ROA     .1569654   .0989054     1.59   0.147    -.0667742     .380705
    Leverage     .5068097   .2115447     2.40   0.040     .0282622    .9853571
          DD    -.1627207   .0195324    -8.33   0.000     -.206906   -.1185355
        LnTA    -.3909016   .1306681    -2.99   0.015    -.6864933     -.09531
                                                                              
    LnTobinQ        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Drisc/Kraay
                                                                              
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.4344
maximum lag: 1                                   Prob > F          =    0.0153
Group variable (i): id                           F(  6,     9)     =      5.08
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        10
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =        40
                                                                              
       _cons     10.51708    1.13356     9.28   0.000      7.95279    13.08137
  NextHedged     .1375062   .1436805     0.96   0.364    -.1875216    .4625341
CapExtoSales     .5652837   .3702174     1.53   0.161    -.2722062    1.402774
         ROA     .2166267   .1198708     1.81   0.104      -.05454    .4877934
    Leverage     .3902168   .0861339     4.53   0.001     .1953684    .5850652
          DD    -.1144675   .0482445    -2.37   0.042    -.2236042   -.0053308
        LnTA    -.4606873   .0479077    -9.62   0.000    -.5690621   -.3523126
                                                                              
    LnTobinQ        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Drisc/Kraay
                                                                              
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.4565
maximum lag: 1                                   Prob > F          =    0.0225
Group variable (i): id                           F(  6,     9)     =      4.47
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        10
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =        40
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APPENDIX H : Estimations of Dynamic Fixed Effect Models with Driscoll-
Kraaystandart errors 
 
Table H. 1 : The Output of Model9 
 
Table H. 2 : The Output of Model10 
 
Table H. 3 : The Output of Model11 
                                                                              
       _cons     3.431596   1.437159     2.39   0.063    -.2627386    7.125932
          HD    -.0307769   .0369738    -0.83   0.443    -.1258211    .0642674
CapExtoSales     .5190227   .1499704     3.46   0.018     .1335115    .9045339
         ROA     .3643189    .502723     0.72   0.501    -.9279718     1.65661
    Leverage     .4770404   .1600828     2.98   0.031     .0655344    .8885463
          DD    -.1660053   .0294795    -5.63   0.002    -.2417848   -.0902259
        LnTA    -.1475069   .0638006    -2.31   0.069    -.3115115    .0164978
 lagLnTobinQ     .1426811   .0928652     1.54   0.185    -.0960365    .3813987
                                                                              
    LnTobinQ        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Drisc/Kraay
                                                                              
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.5687
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000
Group variable (i): id                           F(  7,     5)     =    515.17
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =         6
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =        59
                                                                              
       _cons     3.446549   1.653954     2.08   0.092    -.8050745    7.698172
  NextHedged      .267699   .0726018     3.69   0.014       .08107    .4543279
CapExtoSales     .3889946   .1529739     2.54   0.052    -.0042372    .7822265
         ROA     .3070762   .3958586     0.78   0.473    -.7105108    1.324663
    Leverage     .7042905   .2237712     3.15   0.025     .1290683    1.279513
          DD     -.086514   .0497378    -1.74   0.142    -.2143691    .0413411
        LnTA    -.1569885   .0709179    -2.21   0.078    -.3392888    .0253117
 lagLnTobinQ     .1430935    .079325     1.80   0.131    -.0608178    .3470048
                                                                              
    LnTobinQ        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Drisc/Kraay
                                                                              
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.6197
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000
Group variable (i): id                           F(  7,     5)     =    961.40
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =         6
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =        59
                                                                              
       _cons     5.766271   2.295182     2.51   0.040     .3390276    11.19351
    _It_2011     -.082156    .048388    -1.70   0.133    -.1965754    .0322633
    _It_2010    -.1104889   .0410542    -2.69   0.031    -.2075666   -.0134111
    _It_2009    -.1323602   .0227022    -5.83   0.001    -.1860423   -.0786781
    _It_2008     -.107886   .0239794    -4.50   0.003    -.1645884   -.0511837
    _It_2007    -.1243483   .0172806    -7.20   0.000    -.1652105   -.0834861
          HD    -.0322811   .0693561    -0.47   0.656    -.1962822      .13172
CapExtoSales    -.3822982    .099399    -3.85   0.006    -.6173395   -.1472569
         ROA     .2038483   .2457678     0.83   0.434    -.3773003    .7849968
    Leverage     1.203864   .2202091     5.47   0.001     .6831525    1.724576
          DD    -.2158169    .018307   -11.79   0.000    -.2591061   -.1725277
        LnTA    -.2554607   .1045007    -2.44   0.044    -.5025656   -.0083559
 lagLnTobinQ    -.2494095   .0473686    -5.27   0.001    -.3614184   -.1374006
                                                                              
    LnTobinQ        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Drisc/Kraay
                                                                              
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.6527
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000
Group variable (i): id                           F( 12,     7)     =    104.82
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =         8
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =        47
i.t               _It_2006-2011       (naturally coded; _It_2006 omitted)
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Table H. 4 : The Output of Model12 
 
Table H. 5 : The Ouput of Model13 
 
Table H. 6 : The Output of Model14 
                                                                              
       _cons      8.45956    1.67145     5.06   0.001      4.50721    12.41191
    _It_2011     .0046073   .0415528     0.11   0.915    -.0936494     .102864
    _It_2010    -.0477423   .0369654    -1.29   0.238    -.1351515    .0396668
    _It_2009    -.0920384   .0286632    -3.21   0.015    -.1598161   -.0242607
    _It_2008    -.0611514   .0345034    -1.77   0.120     -.142739    .0204362
    _It_2007    -.0916432   .0218511    -4.19   0.004    -.1433128   -.0399737
  NextHedged     .2068292   .0846458     2.44   0.045     .0066736    .4069848
CapExtoSales    -.3254126   .1561003    -2.08   0.076    -.6945312    .0437059
         ROA      .234716   .1731475     1.36   0.217    -.1747127    .6441447
    Leverage     1.327688   .1417083     9.37   0.000     .9926006    1.662775
          DD    -.1930249    .019781    -9.76   0.000    -.2397994   -.1462503
        LnTA     -.384018   .0756758    -5.07   0.001    -.5629627   -.2050732
 lagLnTobinQ    -.1790828   .0278353    -6.43   0.000    -.2449028   -.1132627
                                                                              
    LnTobinQ        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Drisc/Kraay
                                                                              
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.6813
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000
Group variable (i): id                           F( 12,     7)     =    253.89
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =         8
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =        47
i.t               _It_2006-2011       (naturally coded; _It_2006 omitted)
                                                                              
       _cons     10.65245   .6652958    16.01   0.000     9.118274    12.18662
    _It_2011     .1504646   .0126288    11.91   0.000     .1213426    .1795865
    _It_2010     .1209805   .0091377    13.24   0.000     .0999089    .1420521
    _It_2009     .0424119   .0050016     8.48   0.000     .0308781    .0539457
    _It_2008     .0625322   .0146588     4.27   0.003     .0287288    .0963355
          HD    -.0175113   .0525983    -0.33   0.748    -.1388031    .1037805
CapExtoSales     .0675469   .0875569     0.77   0.463    -.1343596    .2694534
         ROA     .2476762   .1379855     1.79   0.110    -.0705188    .5658712
    Leverage     1.357722   .1330093    10.21   0.000     1.051002    1.664442
          DD     -.265631   .0057359   -46.31   0.000     -.278858    -.252404
        LnTA    -.4826527   .0297584   -16.22   0.000    -.5512758   -.4140297
 lagLnTobinQ    -.2424907   .0485484    -4.99   0.001    -.3544435   -.1305379
                                                                              
    LnTobinQ        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Drisc/Kraay
                                                                              
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.6823
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000
Group variable (i): id                           F( 11,     8)     =    189.33
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =         9
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =        44
i.t               _It_2007-2011       (naturally coded; _It_2007 omitted)
                                                                              
       _cons     11.16773   1.276871     8.75   0.000     8.223262     14.1122
    _It_2011     .1625534   .0160065    10.16   0.000     .1256423    .1994646
    _It_2010     .1269352    .009129    13.90   0.000     .1058836    .1479867
    _It_2009     .0398181   .0100469     3.96   0.004     .0166499    .0629863
    _It_2008     .0651654    .018009     3.62   0.007     .0236367    .1066941
  NextHedged     .1031238   .0975121     1.06   0.321    -.1217395     .327987
CapExtoSales     .1429852   .0961669     1.49   0.175     -.078776    .3647463
         ROA     .2669161    .103785     2.57   0.033     .0275875    .5062447
    Leverage     1.421468   .1484193     9.58   0.000     1.079213    1.763724
          DD    -.2391899   .0300015    -7.97   0.000    -.3083734   -.1700064
        LnTA    -.5091089   .0570439    -8.92   0.000    -.6406525   -.3775653
 lagLnTobinQ    -.2146087   .0378583    -5.67   0.000    -.3019101   -.1273073
                                                                              
    LnTobinQ        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Drisc/Kraay
                                                                              
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.6905
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000
Group variable (i): id                           F( 11,     8)     =    219.83
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =         9
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =        44
i.t               _It_2007-2011       (naturally coded; _It_2007 omitted)
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Table H. 7 : The Output of Model15 
 
Table H. 8 : The Output of Model16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     11.44391   1.419117     8.06   0.000     8.233645    14.65418
    _It_2011     .1021779   .0151398     6.75   0.000     .0679294    .1364264
    _It_2010     .0865179   .0093587     9.24   0.000      .065347    .1076888
    _It_2009     -.009011   .0009938    -9.07   0.000    -.0112591   -.0067629
          HD     .0699045   .0151649     4.61   0.001     .0355992    .1042099
CapExtoSales     .2399308   .0995166     2.41   0.039     .0148086     .465053
         ROA     .1055654   .0446729     2.36   0.042     .0045083    .2066224
    Leverage     1.178191   .1674017     7.04   0.000     .7995021     1.55688
          DD    -.2547317   .0238298   -10.69   0.000    -.3086386   -.2008249
        LnTA    -.5146221     .06283    -8.19   0.000    -.6567534   -.3724908
 lagLnTobinQ    -.0787838   .0817325    -0.96   0.360    -.2636756     .106108
                                                                              
    LnTobinQ        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Drisc/Kraay
                                                                              
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.5986
maximum lag: 1                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000
Group variable (i): id                           F( 10,     9)     =    145.01
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        10
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =        39
i.t               _It_2008-2011       (naturally coded; _It_2008 omitted)
                                                                              
       _cons     15.85354   1.421396    11.15   0.000     12.63812    19.06897
    _It_2011     .1346187   .0163286     8.24   0.000     .0976808    .1715566
    _It_2010     .1034874   .0073882    14.01   0.000     .0867742    .1202006
    _It_2009     .0137661   .0114826     1.20   0.261    -.0122094    .0397416
  NextHedged     .2310774     .14734     1.57   0.151    -.1022287    .5643835
CapExtoSales     .5995721   .2070152     2.90   0.018     .1312712    1.067873
         ROA     .0520385   .0309559     1.68   0.127    -.0179887    .1220656
    Leverage     .9491465   .2117441     4.48   0.002     .4701479    1.428145
          DD    -.1931691   .0542534    -3.56   0.006    -.3158988   -.0704394
        LnTA    -.7058023   .0625918   -11.28   0.000    -.8473948   -.5642098
 lagLnTobinQ    -.1273057   .0848988    -1.50   0.168    -.3193601    .0647486
                                                                              
    LnTobinQ        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Drisc/Kraay
                                                                              
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.6423
maximum lag: 1                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000
Group variable (i): id                           F( 10,     9)     =    400.76
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        10
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =        39
i.t               _It_2008-2011       (naturally coded; _It_2008 omitted)
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APPENDIX I : The Replacement Method for Airtran Airways Data as of 2011 
t: {2002, …., 2011} 
i:{Sales, Depreciation and Amortization, Net Income (Loss), Current Assets, 
Inventories, Total Assets, Short Term Liabilities, Long Term Debt, Shareholder’s 
Equity, Capital Expenditure, Market Value of Common Stock} 
    
  : i
th
 variable of Airtran Airways for the year of t. 
    
  : i
th
 variable of Southwest Airlines for the year of t. 
(    
  )* =        
 
      
   
 
    
    
 
      
   
 
    
    
 
(I.1) 
(       
  * =        
  - (       
 )*(I.2) 
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APPENDIX J : The Aggregation Rule 
t: {2002, …, 2011}; i: {American, Continental, Southwest, JetBlue, Alaska, Airtran} 
t: {2006,…., 2011}; i: { American, Continental, Southwest, JetBlue, Alaska, Airtran, 
US Airways, Hawaiian} 
t: {2007,…., 2011}; i: { American, Continental, Southwest, JetBlue, Alaska, Airtran, 
US Airways, Hawaiian, United} 
t: {2008,…., 2011}; i: { American, Continental, Southwest, JetBlue, Alaska, Airtran, 
US Airways, Hawaiian, United, Delta} 
v: {ROA, Levarage, CapExtoSales, NextHedged, Tobin’s Q, Total Assets, Avg. Fuel 
Cost % of Operating Expense} 
     : i
th
 airline’s weight for year t. 
     : i
th
 airline’s Total Asstes for year t. 
   
 : i
th
 airline’s vth variable for year t. 
   
 ]agg : the aggregated value of vth variable for year t. 
    = 
     
      
 
 
(J.1) 
   
 ]agg =          
  
 (J.2) 
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